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Letter from the Editors

Thirty years ago, Boyd A. Martin helped to found the Martin Institute at the University of Idaho to research the causes of international conflict and the conditions necessary for peace. Since that day, the program that bears his name has worked daily to realize his dream by providing a forum for students of international studies to meet both within and outside the classroom to discuss conflict, peace and security in the international system.

Today, the Martin School of International Studies continues the legacy of its founder through a variety of programs. Among these programs are the Spotlight Seminars, where students are given the opportunity to engage with experts working in the field of international studies in an intimate and comfortable environment. The Institute and School also sponsor the Martin Scholar program, wherein a select group of undergraduate students are given independent research opportunities to study a specific area of interest within a broad topic. Throughout the year, the Institute hosts several Martin Forums at which experts and professionals in relevant fields speak to the students in a forum open to the entire university. Significantly, Boyd Martin was one of the original supporters of the annual Borah Symposium, which was inaugurated in 1938 and hosted First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt. With the continued assistance of the Institute, the Symposium has since hosted many speakers who address issues related to the purpose of the Martin Institute. Past keynote speakers for the Borah Symposium include Thurgood Marshall, Lech Walesa, F.W. de Klerk and Gro Harlem Brundtland.

Last year, the Martin Institute published the first edition of its annual journal to provide a glimpse of what the Martin School of International Studies represents by exhibiting samples of the research and writing undertaken by its undergraduate students each year. This year, we the editors are proud to present to you the second volume of the Martin Journal. The articles included are chosen from among the best papers of the spring 2010 senior capstone course, in which students wrote policy recommendations in the general area of transboundary issues, and among the Martin Scholar papers, researched according to the theme of "Genes and Justice: Biotechnology and Biomedical Policy Formation in a Global Perspective." These papers were selected to show the breadth and depth of study in which Martin Institute students engage. Additionally, we have included the transcript of our interview with former British Ambassador to Peru and Brazil Keith Haskell, who spoke at a Martin Forum in early October 2010 at the University of Idaho.

We sincerely hope that you are able to enjoy these works as much as we have and take away new knowledge about the efforts necessary to establish and maintain peace in the world.

Respectfully,



*S. Connor Arbiter
Senior
International Studies and French*



*Bonnie Magnuson
Senior
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*It now becomes necessary for us to put our major global problems
into a socially relevant global framework.
Our world has become too complex, too interdependent,
to answer these questions by simplistic answers.*

These problems call for creative thinking...

– Boyd A. Martin, founder of the Martin Institute and namesake
of the Martin School of International Studies, at the
Institute's inauguration, 1980



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Sport for Development and Peace

Achieving the Millennium
Development Goals
through Sports-Based
Initiatives

– Chad Mann

Background

In the modern international system, the regions of the world have become increasingly integrated and connected through an ever-expanding network of communications and trade. As this rate of globalization continues to grow, the need to deal with global problems has become a primary focus for the international community. In September 2000, all of the world's countries and major development groups signed the United Nations

(UN) Millennium Declaration.¹ This document focused on the poorest nations of the world and the most pressing obstacles to development within them. The declaration set up the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), targets to overcoming obstacles ranging from poverty eradication to environmental protection and including everything in between. These goals were set to be achieved by the year 2015; however, with only five years left to attain them, efforts must be increased. The downturn of the global economy in the latter part of the past decade created a major roadblock to success with the MDGs, and much progress has either stalled or been reversed.² When world leaders convene during the 20-22 September 2010 Summit on the Millennium Development Goals to review progress, a new, diverse strategy must be implemented in order to achieve success in global development.

As globalization has increased, so too has the recognition of the positive role sport can play in peace and development. The power of sport was discovered as far back as 776 BC, with the first recorded Olympic Games but is most likely much older than that.³ Its ability to mobilize, both positively and negatively, cannot be ignored. On Christmas Day 1914, German and British WWI troops agreed to a one day "football truce," in which both sides suspended fighting to engage in football games and camaraderie.⁴ In 1972, eleven Israeli athletes were murdered at the Munich Olympic Games by Palestinian terrorists. Historically, sport has had a major impact on international relations. In more modern times, the Sport for Development and Peace agenda gained significant momentum in 2001 when former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed former President of the Swiss Confederation Adolf Ogi as his Special Adviser on

1 "A/res/55/2." *Welcome to the United Nations: It's Your World*. 08 Sept. 2000. Web. 06 May 2010. <<http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm>>.

2 United Nations. *The Millennium Development Goals Report 2009*. New York: United Nations, 2009.

3 "Ancient Olympics FAQ 11." *Perseus Digital Library*. Web. 07 Apr. 2010. <<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/Olympics/faq11.html>>.

4 "BBC NEWS | UK | 1914 'football Truce' Anniversary." *BBC NEWS | News Front Page*. 24 Dec. 2004. Web. 07 Apr. 2010. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4123107.stm>.

Sport for Development and Peace. In July 2002, Annan convened the UN Inter-Agency Task Force on Sport for Development and Peace to review activities involving sport within the UN system.⁵ In October 2003, the Secretary-General published the report of the Task Force entitled "Sport for Development and Peace: Towards Achieving the MDGs." This report laid the foundation for the adoption of UN Resolution 58/5 on 3 November 2003. The resolution proclaimed 2005 as the International Year of Sport and Physical Education (IYSPE), in which governments, the private sector, civil society, the UN and all other relevant actors were called upon to fully research ways to integrate sport into their various programs and share their findings with the international community.⁶ While the IYSPE was considered a success, the momentum gained during the year must be sustained. Harnessing the benefits of sport can increase global development success. Following is a detailed list of solutions and policy recommendations aimed at taking advantage of the power of sport to achieve success within each of the MDGs.

MDG #1: Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger

The Economic Impact of Hosting Sporting Events

MDG #1 strives to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger in part by confronting issues related to acceptable employment and wage levels. The 2008 Beijing Olympic Games supported this goal in that the 19.49 billion yuan (US \$2.9 billion) invested in the construction of 102 Olympic projects, in combination with the 19.343 billion yuan (US \$2.9 billion) operating cost, created an astounding amount of employment opportunities for Chinese laborers.⁷ Applying for host positions

for the Francophone Games (reserved for members of the Francophone world), Commonwealth Games (restricted to former members of the British Empire) or U-17/U-20 Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cups can lead to opportunities for access to aid from the governing bodies of these tournaments in the form of stadium renovations, information technology upgrades and infrastructure improvement and the implementation of sports education and community outreach programs. These smaller yet internationally renowned tournaments generally take place in less developed areas of the world, like Francophone venues in Madagascar and Lebanon or Commonwealth Games events in Malaysia and Jamaica. In 2009, FIFA spent US \$172 million on development projects for countries hosting FIFA-related events. With an additional US \$800 million allocated for development between 2011 and 2014, it is imperative for developing countries to apply for event host positions.⁸

The Role of the Sports Industry

As the 2005 IYSPE report stated, the sports industry can play a principal role in obtaining MDG #1. While their impact is not always seen as positive, the fact remains that sporting goods manufacturers have an immense say in the policies and economic policies of developing countries. NIKE, Inc. employs over 800,000 workers in 46 countries worldwide.⁹ The adidas Group, a corporation consisting of sporting goods giants adidas, Reebok and TaylorMade, utilizes over 40,000 employees in 55 countries.¹⁰ Both NIKE, Inc. and the adidas Group work with local governments in setting wage rates and benefits plans. As mandated in the corporations' charters, all workers must receive no less than the locally accepted minimum wage. Along with determining

5 "Our Mandate - What Does Sport Have to Do with the UN." *Welcome to the United Nations: It's Your World*. Web. 07 Apr. 2010. <<http://www.un.org/themes/sport/intro.htm>>.

6 *Report on the International Year of Sport and Physical Education: Sport for a Better World*. (Geneva: United Nations, 2005) 386.

7 "Beijing Olympics Generated China a Profit of 146 Million Dollars." *Thaindian News*. 20 June 2009. Web. 07 Apr. 2010. <http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/sports/beijing-olympics-generated-china-a-profit-of-146-million-dollars_100207361.html>.

8 *FIFA Financial Report 2009*. Rep. 60th FIFA Congress, 10 June 2009. Web. 9 May 2010. <http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/01/18/31/86/fifa_fr09_en.pdf>.

9 "3.1 Overview - NIKE, Inc." *Nikebiz : NIKE, Inc. Official Site, the World's Largest, Leading Athletic Brand*. Web. 07 Apr. 2010. <<http://www.nikebiz.com/crreport/content/workers-and-factories/3-1-0-overview.php?cat=overview>>.

10 "Overview." *Company Overview*. adidas Group. Web. 12 May 2010. <<http://www.adidas-group.com/en/sustainability/Overview/default.aspx>>.

wages, corporations have a substantial impact on the communities within which they operate. For example, the adidas Group's Education and Infrastructure Program with the non-governmental organization (NGO) Sudhaar in Pakistan works to increase access to education and prevent the use of child labor for youth living around the football stitching factory in Sialkot.¹¹ Governments, along with local trade unions and NGOs in many countries, have shown their willingness to develop strong working partnerships with corporations like NIKE, Inc. and the adidas Group in order to ensure proper social and working conditions in combination with adequate compensation for their citizens. These large, multinational corporations are vital to making sure that the number of people living in poverty or employed for less than US \$1 per day will decrease in the future.

MDG #2: Achieve Universal Primary Education

Continued Funding for Physical Education Programs

MDG #2 works to increase literacy rates and educational access so that all children, both boys and girls, will have the ability to complete an entire course of primary education.¹² The IYSPE 2005 Report states that "sport and physical education are essential elements of a quality education" and that they "generally make school more attractive and improve attendance."¹³ Policymakers at all levels must be aware of this fact and account for the benefits that physical education and sport have when constructing educational budgets. As is stated in the 10 December 1959 UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child, "the child shall have full opportunity for play and recreation, which should be directed to the same purposes as education;

society and the public authorities shall endeavour to promote the enjoyment of this right."¹⁴ Financial cuts to physical education programs must be seen as a last resort. Physical education is of immeasurable importance to further success in school. The highest levels of progress and success in other educational subjects such as reading, math and science are much more difficult to attain without incorporating some type of physical activity into curriculums. Financial support to any form of youth physical education/recreation program is vital to achieving MDG #2.

Educating Community Leaders as Sports Advocates and Ambassadors

In further efforts to promote the use of sports in primary education, programs aimed at educating adults to become community leaders and promoters of youth recreation can be incredibly helpful. The Dutch organization of sports physicians and physiotherapists known as Koninklijke Nederlandse Voetbalbond (KNVB) has created the "Coach-the-Coach Programme."¹⁵ In the program, local partner organizations/groups request the services of KNVB instructors. If approved, KNVB personnel travel to the community and spend two or more weeks training adults in basic courses about football theory and practice techniques. Along with the sports-based instruction, community leaders also receive training on how to serve as positive role models for community youth and prepare them to be successful in life beyond sports. The Canadian-based NGO Right to Play incorporates similar techniques by educating community "Leaders" to serve as trainers and advocates in the field of development and sport. Thanks to the efforts of Right to Play, over one million children in the developing world are able to attend regular sporting events and programs.¹⁶ These locally-based, bottom-up programs have proven to be very

11 "Case Studies." adidas Group, 23 Nov. 2009. Web. 09 May 2010. <http://www.adidas-group.com/en/sustainability/community_affairs/case_studies/default.aspx>.

12 "MDG MONITOR :: Goal :: Achieve Universal Primary Education." *MDG MONITOR :: Tracking the Millennium Development Goals*. Web. 07 Apr. 2010. <<http://www.mdgmonitor.org/goal2.cfm>>.

13 *Report on the International Year of Sport and Physical Education: Sport for a Better World*. (Geneva: United Nations, 2005) 386.

14 "Universal Declaration of Human Rights." *Welcome to the United Nations: It's Your World*. 10 Dec. 1959. Web. 07 Apr. 2010. <<http://www.un.org/cyberschoolbus/humanrights/resources/child.asp>>.

15 "Coach the Coach." *Toolkit Sport for Development*. Web. 07 Apr. 2010. <http://www.toolkitsportdevelopment.org/html/topic_3423B0B1-D728-443E-9D7F-9292F09213C7_79900C0B-E924-44F9-A7BB-6EC87D30E2D0_2.htm>.

16 "At a Glance." *Right to Play*. Web. 07 Apr. 2010. <<http://www.righttoplay.com/International/about-us/Pages/AtAGlance.aspx>>.

successful within developing areas, further helping to achieve MDG #2.

MDG #3: Promote Gender Equality & Empower Women

Youth-Based Sporting Events Focused on Gender Integration

MDG #3 directs attention to the effort of completely erasing any inequalities between genders at all education levels and also works to increase both the number of women working in the non-agricultural sector and the number of positions held by women in national parliaments.¹⁷ Sport serves as a way for females to “build confidence and stronger social integration.”¹⁸ Increasing access to sporting/recreation opportunities for girls alongside boys can serve as an effective way to reduce or eliminate gender-based prejudices and discriminations at an early age. Events such as PLAY SOCCER’s Global Peace Games work to organize sporting events around the world that appeal equally to both boys and girls. Since 2001, participation in these Global Peace Games has steadily risen, as has the level of participation for girls. However, much remains to be done to fully gain gender equality. Of the 13,334 children participating in the seven PLAY SOCCER country organizations in 2009, nearly 64%, or 8,446 participants, were males. South Africa has had the most success in attaining equality, with over 40% of participants being female.¹⁹ Following the standards set by the South African program, countries can work to improve their own gender issues through sporting events.

Sport and Inclusion for All

Not only does sport serve as a way to include women alongside men, it is also the perfect medium for incorporating and connecting people living in disadvantageous situations or with various

disabilities. Events similar to those organized by the Special Olympics and Paralympics are excellent examples of this both on an international and local level. The continued, localized efforts of lesser known groups around the world also serve as a way to include disabled or disadvantaged people. In Ethiopia, the 2005 “Sport for All” program mobilized over 400,000 students to take part in different sporting events and awareness seminars. The program brought together 33 physical education teachers from around the country to attend workshops in which different strategies to include disabled people in physical education were discussed.²⁰ The Homeless World Cup, an annual street football tournament, brings groups of homeless teams together from around the world to compete and raise awareness about their living situations, while the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) organizes various sports programs like Kenya’s “Together for Girls” in order to positively affect youth in refugee situations.²¹ Drawing from the international recognition of organizations like the Special Olympics or UNHCR and the vast amount of resources and information available through them, smaller groups have found success with a more detailed, region-specific approach to inclusion, both of women and disabled or disadvantaged people.

MDGs #4 & #5: Reduce Child Mortality & Improve Maternal Health

Increased Access to Information Regarding Childbirth and Maternity

MDGs #4 and #5 are intrinsically connected. Targets to reduce both infant and maternal mortality rates are primarily based upon the education of women prior to pregnancy. As sports work to empower women, they also provide women with access to resources and information about maternity and family planning programs. Africa-based NGO Hoops 4 Hope (H4H) provides a perfect example. H4H works to build basketball

17 “MDG MONITOR :: Goal :: Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women.” *MDG MONITOR :: Tracking the Millennium Development Goals*. Web. 07 Apr. 2010. <<http://www.mdgmonitor.org/goal3.cfm>>.

18 *Report on the International Year of Sport and Physical Education: Sport for a Better World*. (Geneva: United Nations, 2005) 386.

19 “Global Peace Games.” *Play Soccer Nonprofit International*. Web. 07 Apr. 2010. <<http://playsoccer-nonprofit.org/global-peace-games.php>>.

20 *Report on the International Year of Sport and Physical Education: Sport for a Better World*. (Geneva: United Nations, 2005) 386.

21 *Report on the International Year of Sport and Physical Education: Sport for a Better World*. (Geneva: United Nations, 2005) 285.

courts, supply sporting equipment and organize leagues and clinics for youth in Zimbabwe and South Africa.²² H4H uses its "Skills 4 Life" program to educate participants on healthy lifestyle choices in poverty-ridden areas. This program primarily focuses on providing youth aged 18-24 with information promoting abstinence, safe sex, condom use and distribution, counseling and medical treatment.²³ Along with education, increased access to physical/recreational opportunities for expecting mothers significantly reduces the likelihood of infants being born with critical health problems. According to the 2002 World Health Organization's (WHO) World Health Report, more people worldwide were classified as overweight or obese (1 billion) than hungry (800 million).²⁴ Overweight or obese mothers put their children at a much higher risk for developing weight-related health problems later on in life. Programs designed to incorporate women, especially expecting mothers, into physical activities can dramatically decrease this risk.

Using Sports to Connect with Normally Inaccessible Populations

One of the most important targets of MDG #4 is to provide all youth with vital medical care within the first few years of their life. In developing countries, children most in need of immunizations, vaccines and other forms of early childhood care are usually the hardest for medical professionals to reach. Promoting various sporting activities in order to contact these children and provide them with the necessary basic services to lead a healthy childhood has proven very effective. In the WHO: Europe Report on the European Immunization Week, local sporting events were identified as key avenues through which to distribute informational material to parents about the need for certain

medical attention for their children.²⁵ Similar conclusions were drawn by the Republic of Yemen's Ministry of Public Health and Population from the Eastern Mediterranean Region's Vaccination Week. The Ministry recognized sporting events as helpful tools to increase advocacy, education and communication with its population about preventable diseases.²⁶ Sports serve as a way to connect those kids in need with available help.

MDG #6: Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria & Other Diseases

Utilizing Sporting Events as Social Awareness Platforms

In the fight to halt the spread of these deadly diseases and achieve MDG #6, sport can effectively be used as a form of social awareness. In 2004 and 2005, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS joined with the International Olympic Committee and the International Cricket Council, respectively, in agreements to use the sporting events set up by those organizations as awareness platforms.²⁷ Increased cooperation between health and sports related groups will further help to combat these diseases. This has effectively been used at all levels of development. According to the IYSPE 2005 Report, "sport can help reach out to otherwise distanced and marginalized populations and provide positive role models delivering prevention messages."²⁸

A perfect example of this can be seen in Kenya, where 1700 residents of Kwale participated in a full-day football tournament, "Kick AIDS Out of Kwale," designed to promote the empowerment

25 *European Immunization Week: Lessons Learnt and Next Steps*. Rep. World Health Organization: Europe, 20 Sept. 2006. Web. 9 May 2010. <<http://194.255.1.161/document/CPE/ImmunizationWeek.pdf>>.

26 *Draft Country Work Plan for the Implementation of the 2010*. Rep. Republic of Yemen: Ministry of Public Health & Population. Web. 9 May 2010. <http://www.emro.who.int/vpi/vwem/pdf/yem_action_plan.pdf>.

27 *Report on the International Year of Sport and Physical Education: Sport for a Better World*. (Geneva: United Nations, 2005) 386.

28 *Report on the International Year of Sport and Physical Education: Sport for a Better World*. (Geneva: United Nations, 2005) 386.

22 "What H4H Does." *Welcome to Hoops 4 Hope: What We Do*. Hoops 4 Hope. Web. 09 May 2010. <http://www.hoopsafrica.org/about_us/lifeskills.html>.

23 *Report on the International Year of Sport and Physical Education: Sport for a Better World*. (Geneva: United Nations, 2005) 346.

24 "WHO | Chapter 3." *World Health Report*. Web. 07 Apr. 2002. <<http://www.who.int/whr/2002/chapter3/en/index.html>>.

of girls and to increase HIV/AIDS awareness.²⁹ Right to Play's "SportHealth" program works in partnership with local organizations to increase the ability of local groups to use sports to positively affect youth. Right to Play trains local community members on both physical education opportunities and HIV/AIDS prevention measures.³⁰ With this training, community members are able to actively engage local youth by combining the entertaining aspects of recreation with the educational aspects of disease awareness. These programs serve as powerful tools in the effort to eradicate fatal diseases.

Improving Health through the General Global Popularity of Sport

In addition to actual sporting events, the worldwide following of sports can be harnessed to further advance efforts to eradicate deadly diseases like malaria. Different forms of media can serve as strong proponents for taking action. In a 2006 column for the popular magazine, *Sports Illustrated*, entitled "Nothing but Nets," Rick Reilly brought the devastating issue of malaria to the forefront of sports fan consciousness. He challenged his readers to donate US \$10 towards buying anti-malaria bed nets for needy people in Africa.³¹ Building on the momentum created by Reilly's readers, the UN Foundation launched the "Nothing but Nets" campaign in 2006. In partnership with Sports Illustrated, the National Basketball Association's NBA Cares and Major League Soccer's MLS W.O.R.K.S, the UN Foundation has made the goal of ending malaria by 2015 appear very realistic. NBA Cares, during the 2009 NBA Season of Giving, gave away two complimentary tickets to NBA games for each \$10 donation to Nothing but Nets. MLS W.O.R.K.S. engaged teams and fans in the global fight against malaria, while Women's NBA star Ruth Riley furthered the campaign with

awareness events throughout Spain.³² Using the loyal following of sports fans around the world can aid policymakers in achieving the MDGs.

Goal 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability

Effectively Connecting Youth Sports with Environment Protection

Environmental sustainability has been of utmost importance in the latter half of the past century. MDG #7 works to implement sustainable development and stop environmental loss.³³ The IYSPE 2005 Report explains "Sport is an ideal tool to raise awareness about the need to preserve the environment and the importance of environmental sustainability when hosting sports events. The interdependence between the regular practice of outdoor sports and the protection of the environment are obvious for all to realize."³⁴ The UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) has taken the targets of this goal and combined them with the benefits of sport in its Nature and Sport Training Camps. In partnership with the Global Sports Alliance (GSA), UNEP works to provide youth in developing areas of Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean with quality leadership training over issues relating to culture, sport and the environment. The inaugural camp is in Nairobi, Kenya, and has the potential to educate over 30,000 children annually about issues such as recycling and community clean-ups, along with sport-based instruction.³⁵ As the camp continues to evolve, financial aid is needed to sustain its activities along with the UNEP's plans to set up more camps globally. This program provides a creative way to combine sports with environmental

29 Berna, Alison Q. "UNICEF's Programme in Sports for Development." *UNICEF* (2004). Web.

30 "At a Glance." *Right to Play*. Web. 07 Apr. 2010. <<http://www.righttoplay.com/International/about-us/Pages/AtAGlance.aspx>>.

31 *NothingButNets.net: 2009 Annual Report*. Rep. United Nations Foundation. Web. 11 May 2010. <http://www.globalproblems-globalsolutions-files.org/nbn/nbn2010_anrep.pdf>.

32 *NothingButNets.net: 2009 Annual Report*. 11 May 2010. <http://www.globalproblems-globalsolutions-files.org/nbn/nbn2010_anrep.pdf>.

33 "MDG MONITOR :: Goal :: Ensure Environmental Sustainability." *MDG MONITOR :: Tracking the Millennium Development Goals*. Web. 07 Apr. 2010. <<http://www.mdgmonitor.org/goal7.cfm>>.

34 *Report on the International Year of Sport and Physical Education: Sport for a Better World*. (Geneva: United Nations, 2005) 386.

35 "Nature and Sports Training Camps. – *United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) - Home Page* –. Web. 07 Apr. 2010. <http://www.unep.org/sport_env/Activities/NatureCamp.asp>.

education, furthering progress towards achieving the goal of environmental protection.

Providing Opportunities for International Communication & Cooperation

In order to truly make progress on the goal of environmental sustainability, educating the international sports community about the connection between sports and the environment is crucial. The Global Forum for Sports and the Environment (G-ForSE) provides a setting for sporting goods manufacturers, event producers, sports federations and sports enthusiasts to discuss their roles in incorporating environmental protection into sports.³⁶ Every two years, UNEP and the GSA bring representatives from these different sports-related sectors together to focus on environmental action, education and promotion within sports. Topics range from improving sporting facilities (golf courses, ski resorts, surfing destinations, etc.) and their environmental impact, reducing the carbon footprint of major sporting events and ways to better produce and market sporting goods.³⁷ G-ForSE was partially responsible for convincing the Beijing Organizing Committee of the XXIX Olympiad to sign the "Green Games Agreement" with UNEP. This agreement focused on everything from pollution levels to solid waste disposal methods.³⁸ Participating in the G-ForSE should be the first step taken by any country looking to become more environmentally conscious and friendly within its respective sporting sector.

MDG #8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development

Mainstreaming the Presence of Sport in National & Regional Political Agendas

Without a strong commitment to include sport in every feasible aspect of the political agenda,

benefits of using sport as a tool to achieve the MDGs will never be fully recognized. In the European Union's (EU) first ever White Paper on Sport, released in 2007, the Commission of the European Communities stated:

"The Commission recommends strengthening the cooperation between the health, education and sport sectors to be promoted at ministerial level in the Member States in order to define and implement coherent strategies to reduce overweight, obesity and other health risks. In this context, the Commission encourages Member States to examine how to promote the concept of active living through the national education and training systems, including the training of teachers."³⁹

With this statement, the EU acknowledged the importance of the sport sector and its cooperation with other essential sectors of society. Giving more attention and respect to each country's sports ministry will bring positive results.⁴⁰ To do this, policymakers can use the growing numbers of guidelines, checklists, toolkits and other forms of information available to them online. Using the 2005 Report on the International Year of Sport and Physical Education as a reference will also serve as a way to help put more emphasis on the use of sports to achieve developmental success.

Promoting Global Discussion on Sports for Development

Increasing the focus on levels of fair trade, good governance, global debt, and the flow of information are all covered by MDG #8. However, specifically addressing the needs of least developed countries is the most important aspect. Sport, according to the 2005 IYSPE report, "offers endless opportunities for innovative partnerships for development and can be used as a tool to build and foster partnerships between developed and developing nations to work towards achieving

36 "Global Forum for Sports and Environment (G-ForSE)." *Global Forum for Sports and Environment — G-ForSE*. United Nations Environmental Programme & Global Sports Alliance. Web. 11 May 2010. <http://www.g-forse.com/index_e.html>.

37 "Global Forum for Sports and Environment (G-ForSE)." 11 May 2010. <http://www.g-forse.com/index_e.html>.

38 *Report on the International Year of Sport and Physical Education: Sport for a Better World*. (Geneva: United Nations, 2005) 145.

39 *White Paper on Sport*. Working paper. Commission of the European Communities, 7 Nov. 2007. Web. 11 May 2010. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2007/com2007_0391en01.pdf>.

40 *Report on the International Year of Sport and Physical Education: Sport for a Better World*. (Geneva: United Nations, 2005) 381.

the MDGs.”⁴¹ It also has the ability to mobilize and connect resources from varying backgrounds, including governments, the UN and other inter-governmental organizations, NGOs, civil society and the media. Sports ambassadors like tennis great Roger Federer, football superstar David Beckham or marathoner Margaret Okayo have helped by using their international celebrity to call attention to the importance sport plays in development, specifically for the UN Children’s Fund. NGOs like People to People Sports Ambassadors work to connect youth around the world through international sporting events. Providing incentives for both celebrities and youth to champion the cause of sports will go far in promoting the benefits of sports in relation to the MDGs.

Preferred Program

The 2015 deadline for achieving the Millennium Development Goals looms larger every day. Implementing sports-based initiatives can go a long ways towards achieving each one of the goals. In the globalized world in which we live, governments cannot have much success without accounting for the presence and interests of large, multi-national corporations. Countries must develop strong working partnerships with corporations within the sports industry in order to ensure proper working conditions and wages for the millions of people employed by these businesses worldwide. The corporations provide a substantial contribution to the economies of the developing world, meaning that effective compromises between governments and businesses must be reached in order to maximize benefits for both.

The value of physical education must continue to be promoted and realized at all levels of policymaking. When building federal and local educational budgets, physical education must remain a top priority, not an exception. For nations providing aid to the developing world, certain stipulations must be created in order to ensure part of the donation is directed towards improving the role of physical education. Moreover, education

must also be community-based in order for success to be attained. The training of community leaders in areas of sport and life skills is vital to ensuring that youth are receiving positive messages. The funding of sport-based initiatives aimed at providing educational access to girls and women, especially pregnant women, about the benefits of physical activity is of utmost importance.

Governments should look to host or sponsor local and internationally recognized sporting events. These events, ranging from the Olympics to smaller events like the Commonwealth Games, can effectively be used as platforms from which to spread information and awareness about regional issues like environmental protection and disease prevention to sections of populations that would otherwise be inaccessible. The beneficial economic impact of these sporting events cannot be more strongly emphasized. Construction of new sporting venues and infrastructure provides host countries with an abundance of new jobs, and the revenue pulled in by the host country during the course of a tournament, like the FIFA World Cup, is matched by relatively few other international events.

Policymakers must also be willing to mainstream sport and its benefits into all aspects of their country’s work. Sport and physical activity must be present in both regional and national agendas, as well as a requirement for future financial aid packages. Accepting the fact that sport can help with development in a variety of ways is crucial to finding success. Attending international forums on sports like G-ForSE can connect countries with others in similar positions with similar goals. Combining this focus and commitment to sport along with any mixture of the abovementioned policy recommendations will provide a new dynamic to the strategy of achieving the Millennium Development Goals and will undoubtedly further their success.



⁴¹ *Report on the International Year of Sport and Physical Education: Sport for a Better World.* (Geneva: United Nations, 2005) 386.

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The Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Complex

Company Level Course of
Action in Military
Operations Other Than War

– Nicholas C. Castle

The Context of Irregular Warfare

A snapshot of the world today brings to light the powerful conclusion that irregular warfare will constitute the vast majority of conflict in the near future. In 2008, there were 36 armed conflicts, of which a total of five reached the intensity level of “War,” meaning that more than 1000 battle-related deaths were recorded in the conflict throughout the year. Of these 36 conflicts, only one interstate

conflict was registered (the minor engagement between Djibouti and Eritrea) though five were intrastate with foreign involvement, including the United States’ engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan.¹ The traditional visage of interstate conflict as the predominate paradigm of armed engagement is no longer representative. Though the United States’ involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq were considered foreign engagements, the nature of the conflicts were respectively irregular and civil conflict. This irregular warfare often falls in the spectrum of conflict delineated as “military operations other than war” (MOOTW), in which the objectives of conflict will shift from physical terrain to human perception and the means of battle from kinetic operations to stabilization and infrastructure support. This requires a mindset capable of utilizing the United States’ military arm violently yet precisely in order to create a stable environment conducive to the development of a nation.

In April 1975, a week before the fall of Saigon, Colonel Harry Summers stated to North Vietnamese Colonel Tu, “You know, you never defeated us on the battlefield.” Colonel Tu thought about that for a minute then replied: “That may be so. But it is also irrelevant.”² The battlefield of MOOTW is as much socioeconomic as tactical, the human dimension of warfare is far more prevalent, and the tools required to counter these irregular threats will be non-traditional in a strict military sense. Commanders, soldiers, and “Marines need to learn when to fight with weapons and when to fight with information, humanitarian aid, economic advice, and a boost toward good governance for the local people.”³ The means necessary to counter these irregular threats range from counterinsurgency to psychology, from counterterrorism to political-economy. However, commanders are often sent to an area of operation (AO) with the simple objective of stabilization. This paper seeks to address

- 1 UCDP Database. “Uppsala Conflict Data Program.” Uppsala University. 2008. 06 April 2010. http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/links_faq/faq.htm
- 2 Halloran, Richard. “Strategic Communication.” 2007. 06 April 2010. <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/07autumn/Halloran.pdf>
- 3 McDaniel, LtCol. L., Hardesty, S., “Countering Irregular Threats”. Marine Corps Combat Development Command. (2006): 3.

the means to that stable end: to provide policy recommendations surrounding the issues of what tactics to pursue, of the balance between political and military methodologies, and ultimately of how to counter irregular threats in the context of MOOTW.

Counterterrorism

Defined as "operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism,"⁴ counterterrorism (CT) constitutes those activities that focus on the killing, capture, and destruction of terrorist entities and cells. CT tactics were employed in Afghanistan in early 2002 with some measure of success. US special operation and paramilitary forces, in coordination with Northern Alliance leaders, nearly cleaned the Taliban out of Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom.⁵ Its means are violent, but the results are significant given the input. CT activities are "discreet, but effectively deadly."⁶

CT offers a number of benefits in that it allows for US military personnel to take advantage of their specialization in direct action activities using coordinated and overwhelming force. Furthermore, CT operations actually reduce the risk placed on military personnel in relation to other strategies designed to counter irregular threats. CT often allows commanders to choose the time and place of engagements, which in turn shifts the initiative to U.S. forces. CT, however, requires thorough and effective intelligence. The results of faulty intelligence in combination with overwhelming force could be civilian casualties. Despite this drawback, CT most directly addresses those issues of physical security that may be of primary importance to the local populace. As Brigadier General Kelly of the Australian Army (Ret.) noted, "No one places their life and the lives of their families at risk by rejecting the Taliban authority

merely because they have, or are promised, more electricity or cleaner water."⁷

Counterinsurgency

At the start of 2006, General Chiarelli took command of the Army's day-to-day operations in Iraq, and he was certain that no amount of killing or capturing could exhaust the ranks of unemployed and angry Iraqis willing to join the insurgency... Chiarelli became convinced that the way to win Baghdad was through civilian outreach, not skirmishes. When Chiarelli's men compared maps of insurgent activity with those showing access to electricity and drinkable water, they found a direct correlation between terrorist incidents and a lack of services.⁸

Counterinsurgency (COIN) is those political, economic, military, paramilitary, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency.⁹ Its practice is designed to address the root causes of insurgent activity in order to win the hearts and minds of a population. This method requires extensive investment over a broad spectrum of activities. It entails the promotion of institutions for governance and market, the implementation of infrastructure projects to address the essential needs of a population, the integration of local leaders to hold a vested interest in working with US forces vis-à-vis insurgent elements, and the provision of a population's physical security until stabilization. COIN operations are extremely multi-faceted and therefore require a large investment of manpower and personnel that will be in harm's way. However, COIN operations provide the most beneficial results in terms of integration, governance, and ultimately the defeat of insurgent elements by addressing the grievances which gave root to the initial causes of

4 Mattis, J.N. LtGen., Patraeus, D.H. LtGen., "FMFM 3-24 Counterinsurgency". Marine Corps Combat Development Command. (2006): p. Glossary-3.

5 Warner, V.F., "Afghanistan Context and What's Next." Joint Forces Quarterly. Iss. 56, 1st Quarter. (2010): 20.

6 Captain G. M., U.S. Army Special Forces. Personal Communication. January 16, 2010.

7 Warner, 24.

8 Berman, E., Shirapio, J.N., Felter, J.H., "Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq?". December 2009. 06 April 2010. <http://econ.ucsd.edu/~elib/ham.pdf>.

9 Mattis, J.N. LtGen., Patraeus, D.H. LtGen., "FMFM 3-24 Counterinsurgency". Marine Corps Combat Development Command. (2006): p. 1-1.

the insurgency. Of primary importance to COIN operations is the integration and vested interest of the local population in COIN activities. "Long-term success requires the establishment of viable indigenous leaders and institutions that can carry on without significant American support."¹⁰

"Hearts and Minds": COIN as a Problem of Modernization

The original intent of "Hearts and Minds" was as a theory of insurgency and how to counter that insurgency. The term "Hearts and Minds" was coined in 1952 by Sir Gerald Templar during the Malayan Emergency when he stated, "The answer [to defeating the insurgents] ... rests in the hearts and minds of the Malayan people."¹¹ The theory is based upon two key principles: the problems of modernization and the insurgent need for popular support. "Scholars observed that, in many societies, the negative consequences of economic development to which the developed nations adjusted over the course of decades and centuries were being experienced in the space of years by the developing countries. As the economic conditions underlying society began to shift, pressure built on traditional society."¹² This inability to keep pace with societal change, in addition to declining government provision, leads to disorder and instability vulnerable to insurgent causes.

Based on the premise that insurgencies are rooted in the problems of modernization and economic grievances and that insurgents utilize these grievances as a basis for popular support, the solution becomes obvious. COIN policies should seek to "restore the hope of the people and gain their support for the government. In order to do this, COIN would consist of providing the people security from predations by government

and insurgent forces and reducing the negative consequences of development while enhancing the positive aspects."¹³ Through an emphasis on providing human rights, promoting legitimate governing institutions, improving living standards, and reducing abuse of government power, the theory seeks to win the "Hearts and Minds" of the people in order to delegitimize the causes insurgencies promote. Consequently, the support structures of insurgencies dissolve and with them the insurgency itself.

Cost/Benefit Theory: Carrots and Sticks for the Rational Peasant

Juxtaposed with the "Hearts and Minds" model is the Cost/Benefit theory and its further implications to COIN. Cost/Benefit theory is premised on the framework that insurgencies are systems requiring certain inputs in order to survive. "From an operational point of view, what an insurgent movement requires for successful and expanding operations is not popular support, in the sense of attitudes of identification and allegiance, but rather a supply of certain inputs...at a reasonable cost, interpreting cost to include expenditure of coercion as well as money."¹⁴ It further attacks the "Hearts and Minds" theory's central tenant of increasing living standards, *ceteris paribus*, leading to decreased operational ability of insurgencies. In effect, increased living standards could simply allow more resources available for predation or use by insurgent elements, according to Cost/Benefit theory. This outlook is replicated in many real world scenarios, given that insurgencies are often comprised of a certain sect, ethnic background, religious affiliation, etc. Often insurgencies will prey on those groups not affiliated with the insurgency, as in Somalia in 1991 with the warlords, Iraq in 2004-06 with sectarian violence, and in Vietnam with those not affiliated with the Viet Cong/Communist ideology.

COIN operations should hold a "quid pro quo [agreement] between the government and

¹³ Long, Austin. p. 23.

¹⁴ Long, Austin. On "Other" War: Lessons from Five Decades of Counterinsurgency Research. RAND National Defense Research Institute. (2006). p. 24. www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG482.pdf.

¹⁰ Mattis, J.N. LtGen., Patraeus, D.H. LtGen., "FMFM 3-24 Counterinsurgency". Marine Corps Combat Development Command. (2006): p. 1-129.

¹¹ Dickinson, Elizabeth. "A Bright Shining Slogan: How "Hearts and Minds" Came to Be". Foreign Policy. Sept./Oct. (2009). http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/08/13/a_bright_shining_slogan.

¹² Long, Austin. On "Other" War: Lessons from Five Decades of Counterinsurgency Research. RAND National Defense Research Institute. (2006). p. 22. www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG482.pdf.

population: 'Rural improvement programs, in order to be of any benefit as an adjunct of counterinsurgency efforts, must be accompanied by efforts to exact something in return for whatever benefits and improvements are provided.'"¹⁵ COIN efforts, therefore, should be evaluated in terms of how well they either raise the cost of inputs to the system or interfere with outputs. COIN activities should seek partnerships, be they allegiance to government institutions or enhanced information/intelligence in return for security, government, etc. Ultimately, what matters to both systems is not a population's attitudes but its actions.

Awards and Amnesty: Incentives for Insurgents

As seen in many civil and guerrilla campaigns, some soldiers are pressed into service through the threat of harm to themselves or their family. These men become part of an insurgency through the high costs imposed upon their lives. To the counterinsurgent, this is an opportunity of unparalleled proportion as it creates a chance for effective intelligence to reach the command structures within the insurgent systems. Furthermore, it delegitimizes insurgent forces as potential enemy, as they would then leave the battle in order to protect what is deemed most important: safety and security for their families and themselves.

The RAND institute studied this issue in depth in the context of the Vietnam War, finding that "both amnesty and reward were potentially cost-effective programs, as even expensive rewards were often more efficient at removing enemy combatants than were large military actions. More importantly, amnesty made surrender a potentially attractive option, reducing the need for a "fight-to-the-finish."¹⁶ Criticism against award and amnesty programs states they are only effective at the lowest echelons of organization. Furthermore, tracking individuals after they leave the program is difficult and expensive, causing some to see them

as US-sponsored "rest and relaxation" programs for the enemy. To draw parallels with the US Witness Protection Program, award and amnesty programs can be highly cost-effective, and they may be the only way to gather the actionable intelligence necessary to conduct effective COIN operations.

Unity of Command

It is imperative to remember that military operations constitute only one aspect of transition from conflict to relative stabilization. "All three D's – defense, diplomacy and development – are equally important and must work closely together at various levels. For example, community infrastructure projects will fail if there is no security to hold the area."¹⁷ MOOTW will have numerous actors within the AO representing different interests that may or may not correlate with the assigned objective. Indigenous leadership, host-nation government, IGOs, NGOs, etc. will have interests, both competing and conducive, to the objective of stabilization. Some entities may refuse to work with US military operations in order to maintain a neutral status while others may simply refuse on the grounds of political power play, non-aligning goals, etc. Military commands are designed to work independently due to the nature of deploying in hostile and austere environments. Commanders, therefore, may need to seek to accomplish mission objectives without coordinating extensively with other organizations.

This does not denote a discontinuity of effort but simply a unity of command, given that communication structures, doctrine, and operational roles clearly delineated will allow for efficiency in operations through coordinated military structures. In order for this to succeed, defined roles by all actors must be outlined to ensure separate organizations work under a common intent leading to mission success. Tasks should not overlap but rather coordinate to allow each actor to take advantage of his or her specific specialization to efficiently contribute to mission

15 Long. P. 25.

16 Long, Austin. On "Other" War: Lessons from Five Decades of Counterinsurgency Research. RAND National Defense Research Institute. (2006). p. 26. www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG482.pdf.

17 Office of Transition Initiatives. "Lessons in Counterinsurgency Programming." USAID. December 2009. 06 April 2010. http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/pubs/OTI_Lessons_in_Counterinsurgency_Dec_2009.pdf.

success.

Coordination with Civilian Agencies

Commanders may choose to institute a coordinated unity of effort through extensive planning with civilian agencies. Two primary reasons support this decision. First is the role of mission creep, wherein military personnel conduct activities more effectively tasked to other organizations. The second is specialization, in that most frontline units are trained for the specific purpose of combat arms. Though these units can readily adapt to development activities, they are best utilized to their designed purpose, which usually means operating in the context of conflict and chaos. Inter-agency operations and coordination allow commanders to utilize their specialization and avoid mission creep. "Almost everything in counterinsurgency is inter-agency. And everything important – from policing to intelligence to civil-military operations to trash collection – will involve your company working with civilian actors and local indigenous partners you can't control, but whose success is essential for yours"¹⁸. Note that while civilians do like working with the military, they do not like working for the military. Extensive inter-actor cooperation will build a unity of effort that is unmatched, but it will require a realization that separate agendas exist and that diplomatic demeanor is necessary in order to coordinate these into a combined program of action.

During 2006 in Iraq, General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker worked side by side in nearly every important engagement, whether testimony before Congress or leadership in institution development. They worked extensively in coordination with one another in order to provide for an effective transition to a stabilized Iraq.¹⁹ Commanders should establish a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) to coordinate the interaction of US and multinational military

forces with a wide variety of civilian agencies. In establishing a CMOC, a civil affairs officer or civilian personnel familiar with governmental and military operations should advise and assist in establishment and operation. Commanders should seek to work with representative peers with other organizations to promote a common perspective within the AO.

Infrastructure Investment

FMFM 3-24 Counterinsurgency is the military doctrine written in response to the unique nature of MOOTW, specifically the conduct and theory of insurgencies and how to counter them. It addresses a hierarchy of needs approach for designing COIN operations. It seeks to establish physical security, address essential needs of the population, and dissolve economic grievances in respective order to combat the root causes of insurgent and terrorist activities. This sequential hierarchy of needs provides a useful but potentially misleading context, given that complete physical security of a population will be nearly impossible in a conflict-prone region. An alternative is to address the needs based on the highest rates of return given specific inputs. Infrastructure investment, though not specifically attacking insurgent elements, will simultaneously demonstrate credible actions by US forces while addressing the economic grievances of a population.

Commanders should assess the inputs placed in relation to projected returns. Note, however, that a premium should be placed on the influence of population perception in the context of COIN operations and MOOTW. This means that infrastructure projects should seek to utilize local labor, and projects should be designed in concurrence with indigenous leaders. Calculated social rate of return should be compared against the normal capital return of other projects, with a premium placed on social perception. A study designed to assess this specific issue found that "essentially the lower-middle and upper-middle income classes of developing countries"

18 "Small Unit Leader's Guide to Counterinsurgency." Marine Corps Combat Development Command. (2006): 115.

19 Crocker, Ryan. "Ambassador Ryan Crocker's Remarks at Civil-Military Coordination Conference". Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq. (2008). http://iraq.usembassy.gov/sp_08112008.html

are most conducive to infrastructure projects²⁰. However, the cost-benefit analysis of a project with a premium on social rate of return in the context of counterinsurgency operations would give commanders the optimal decision when seeking a specific course of action in infrastructure investment.

The Role of Institutions

Economic development theory has emerged today with a focus on governing institutions and their role in good governance, justice, and regulatory measures.²¹ However, commanders in COIN and MOOTW often deploy to environments where a functioning government is nearly non-existent. This allows the role of institution building to play an eminent role in the activities of both civil and military operations. The establishment of institutions that are simultaneously credible and supported by local populations will reduce the incentive to work with insurgent elements. Furthermore, the promotion of good governance will allow a working relationship with local entities while providing justification of foreign presence in AOs.

Two imperatives exist in the establishment of institutions: the leadership must be from popular local support, and it cannot be seen as corrupt. Both imperatives are designed to give an indigenous population a vested interest in working with and through these new institutions. Commanders "must be extremely cautious to ensure that the institutions or individuals supported are credible. Avoid backing an individual or institution viewed as corrupt – triangulate information carefully and where possible, spread risk by developing multiple partnerships."²² These multiple partnerships will

serve as "eyes and ears" in numerous sectors of the population base, in turn offering actionable intelligence and information. Institutions must be local in nature and uncorrupt in existence and perception.

Policy Recommendations

"Successful guerrilla operations involve the people. It is the quality of their resistance to the enemy and support for the guerrillas which in the end will be the decisive factor...In fact, a guerrilla force will be unable to operate in an area where the people are hostile to its aims."

—Handbook for Volunteers of the Irish Republican Army

CT and COIN operations both provide powerful tools in solving the many precarious problems associated with MOOTW. A commander should seek to utilize both, but a focus ought to be placed on COIN. Counterinsurgency operations are dynamic. They are characterized by an attempt at armed social work in a hostile environment seeking to gain the support of an often suspicious population. "The aim in counterinsurgency is to return the parent society to a stable, peaceful mode of interaction—on terms favorable to the government."²³ It is a competition for the support of a population base, and the stakes are very real. However, the escalation of violence is not inevitable. Violence and kinetic operations will constitute a portion of any COIN operation, but so will humanitarian aspects. COIN requires an adaptable response to a shifting "fog of war" in which insurgents move like ghosts in haze. The key to rooting out these insurgents rests not in continuous pursuit of an enemy that emerges and then fades into the backdrop of a civilian population but in winning the support of the civilian population itself. In turn, the support structure of an insurgency disappears, and then government forces hold the original objective of a guerrilla campaign.

Commanders should utilize hearts and minds ideology but framed within the paradigm of

20 Canning, D., Bennathan, E. "The Social Rate of Return on Infrastructure Investments". The World Bank. 2000. 06 April 2010. http://www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2000/08/19/000094946_000803015893/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf.

21 Thorbecke, Erik. "The Evolution of Development Doctrine, 1950-2005". *Advancing Development: Core Themes in Global Economics*. (2007): 3.


22 Office of Transition Initiatives. "Lessons in Counterinsurgency Programming." USAID. December 2009. 06 April 2010. http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/pubs/OTI_Lessons_in_Counterinsurgency_Dec_2009.pdf.

23 Kilcullen, David. *Counterinsurgency*. Oxford University Press. New York: p. 159.

cost/benefit methods. Hearts and minds theory provides the ideals necessary to conduct effective COIN operations, but programs of cost/benefit design will be most effective. "This is a competition for control, and the side that best establishes a resilient, full-spectrum system of control that can affect security, rule of law, and economic activity at the local level is likely to prevail."²⁴ Award and amnesty programs should be implemented; as they are the only method to finding key information necessary to take down insurgent networks.

Civil-military operations are paramount if any measure of success is to be achieved. Commanders should remember that they are part of very long process which starts with stabilization from a conflict-prone AO but which will ideally transition into a developing region. Presenting a fluid, unified effort on the part of all actors is necessary to provide for this transition, and this absolutely requires coordinated civil-military operations. Institution and infrastructure investment could very arguably fall within the spectrum of civilian agencies tasks. However, commanders are often

in a unique position to support or assist in both. Institution building should take on a primary importance, though ideal operations would allow for development of each simultaneously. Commanders need to assess which actions will benefit the community and promote stability while transitioning governance from US forces to indigenous populations.

"In 2006 [in Iraq] a Shi'ite sheik in Tal Afar irately described the situation in a city council meeting, declaring to his Sunni colleagues: The people who are fighting—where do they come from? They don't pop up from the ground. Some of you know who they are."²⁵ The key to finding these phantoms is through the intrinsic support of the local populace, which will in turn lead to actionable intelligence through tip offs, cost/benefit means, or award and amnesty programs. This emphasis on enhanced intelligence combined with winning the "hearts and minds" of a populace in the context of competitive control holds the means to peace, stabilization, and less blood spilt upon the sands of war. 

24 Kilcullen, David. *Counterinsurgency*. Oxford University Press. New York: p. 159.

25 Berman, E., Shirapio, J.N., Felter, J.H. "Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq?" (2009). p.6. <http://econ.ucsd.edu/~elib/ham.pdf>.

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Seeking Asylum in Europe

– Josh Hickey

The concept of asylum in modern law has its roots in ancient Greek and Roman law and the Catholic Church of medieval times. Sanctuary, or asylum, was granted to fugitives and slaves in temples and churches. In modern international law, a refugee is defined under Chapter 1, Article 1, A. of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter referred to as the Geneva Convention) as a person who:

... owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being

*outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.*¹

An asylum seeker is defined as one who fulfills the criteria of a refugee but has not yet been granted refuge in any nation. Typically, an asylum seeker enters a country, either legally or illegally, and requests asylum by the authorities of that nation who, by right of territorial sovereignty, are allowed to determine if the claim is valid and either accept or reject the claim to asylum. If asylum is granted, that person then becomes a refugee and is subject to the laws and rights pertaining to refugees in the host nation.²

Beginning in the 1980s, Europe began to see a dramatic influx of immigrants from Eastern Europe and Africa, with more recent arrivals from Asia and the Middle East. Facing an economic downturn and high national unemployment, European nations reacted by setting up strict quotas on the number of immigrants they would receive annually. However, simply making it more difficult to migrate to a country through normal means did not reduce the demand of people who wished to move there, as discussed in a study of behavioral economics by Peter Schaeffer.³ This instead led to an increase in illegal immigration.

One way immigrants who arrive in the European Union are accused of exploiting the lengthy waiting period of the quota system is by filing a bogus claim for political asylum, when in actuality they face no credible threat at home other than economic hardship⁴ (although it has been argued that economic hardship leads to conditions that could be considered sufficient enough one to request

1 UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137.

2 Ibid. Ch. 1, Art. 7.

3 Schaeffer, Peter. "Refugees: On the Economics of Political Migration." *International Migration*. Feb 2010, Vol. 48 Issue 1, p1-22.

4 UNHCR The State of The World's Refugees 1997: A Humanitarian Agenda - Chapter 5: The Asylum Dilemma State of the World's Refugees. 1 January 1997. <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=3eb7ba414&query=economic%20asylum>. 22 March 2010.

asylum⁵). These false claims bog down the already stressed asylum system, making it more difficult for legitimate claims to be reviewed.

Arriving at a policy for the fair treatment of asylum seekers, while at the same time respecting the sovereignty of European member states, will be the focus of this paper. Asylum policy will be analyzed from the “top-down,” at the UN and EU levels, along with various national policies forming a “bottom-up” approach, in order to determine the best solution for dealing with the abuse.

The UN and the UNHCR:

This solution explores whether or not the UN, and specifically the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), is best suited to deal with claims of asylum and identifying whether they are economic or political in nature. The UN is a legitimate option due to the adoption of the Geneva Convention and its subsequent protocols to which all European nations are signatories. This obliges states to accept all applications for asylum. Although the nation may reject the application, pursuant to Article 33 of the Convention, which outlines the principle of non-refoulement, states are prevented from returning asylum seekers to the place from which they are fleeing.⁶ Although the convention is a binding agreement, the degree to which nations can disregard certain provisions of the convention with impunity, suggests that by itself, the convention is not strong enough to ensure asylum seekers are treated fairly.

Tasked with upholding the Geneva Convention is the UNHCR. Following the displacement of tens of thousands of Europeans in the wake of World War II, the UN created the office in 1950. Today, the UNHCR assists refugees and asylum seekers throughout the world in finding them a new residence or in returning them to their original countries. Furthermore, the UNHCR educates prospective asylees who are making their claim based on economic reasons with other possible

venues for migration. The fact that the office has successfully helped millions of refugees and asylum seekers in the last 60 years⁷ shows that it is potentially a strong solution due to the vast amount of experience it has obtained.

The EU:

Major differences in asylum policy among European Union members led to the creation of a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) by the European Council in Tampere, Finland.⁸ The second phase of the CEAS, as outlined in the Hague Programme of 2004, includes a set of minimum standards that must be adhered to by all member states by 2012. The CEAS builds on the existing framework for the treatment and protection of asylum seekers and asylees found not only in the Geneva Convention but also in the Schengen Agreement of 1985, the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, and the Dublin regulations of 1990 and 2003.⁹

In 2003, the EU adopted a set of minimum standards for the CEAS which ensure that all asylum seekers will be granted a comprehensive interview for refuge within a timely manner. It mandates that legal counsel, health care, food, and shelter shall be provided to all asylum seekers while their application is being considered.¹⁰ In 2005, the European Community adopted as part of the CEAS a Policy Plan on Legal Immigration,¹¹ which deals in part with curtailing asylum claims of economic immigrants by providing alternative methods of entry for high-skilled workers and seasonal workers and training for low-skilled workers. It also addresses “pull-factors” that must be countered, such as the demand for illegal labor.

7 UNHCR-History of UNHCR. <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cbc.html>. 20, March 2010

8 European Council. A Common European Asylum System. 15, 16 October 1999. Tampere European Council.

9 Hatton, Timothy J. “The Rise and Fall of Asylum: What Happened and Why?” *The Economic Journal*, Vol. 119, No. 535, (Feb., 2009), pp. F183-F213. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02228.x>.

10 Council of the European Union. Council Directive 2003/9/EC. L. 31/18. 27 January 2003. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2003/l_031/l_03120030206en00180025.pdf.

11 European Community. Policy Plan on Legal Migration {SEC(2005)1680}. 21 Dec 2005. Brussels, Belgium.

5 Zimmermann, Susan. “Why Seek Asylum? The Roles of Integration and Financial Support.” *International Migration*; Feb 2010, Vol. 48 Issue 1, p199-231.

6 UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.

The obligatory nature of the CEAS ensures that a system will be implemented in all European Union member states. This solution respects and increases the rights of asylum seekers while allowing member states to interact democratically in the process at the same time.

The German Asylum System:

Although Germany complies with the Geneva Convention and all European directives regarding asylum policy, it, like some member states, claims exceptions to the directives. In the case of Germany, one important concept of asylum policy, that of a "safe third country ruling" is notable, as, due to German influence, the ruling was integrated into European asylum policy.¹² The safe third country ruling exception allows a nation to return an asylum seeker to a "safe third country" if it can be proven that before entering that country, the migrant lived in or passed through a country that the host country considers to be "safe." This was an effective method in controlling asylum claims in Germany due to the fact that it does not share a border with a non-European nation. The only legal way to claim asylum in Germany is to arrive by plane or a non-stop boat, which effectively excludes a great deal of potential asylees who do not possess the means to arrive in Germany thusly. In 1992, 4.25% requests for asylum were accepted in Germany. Ten years later, and nine years after the safe third country ruling, Germany accepted only 1.83% of applications.

While this may seem that the safe third country ruling is an effective way to deal with asylum abuse, the measure is not without its criticisms. It has been accused of violating the Geneva Convention principle of non-refoulement because there are no safeguards to ensure that a chain of safe third country rulings do not return an asylum

seeker to the place he or she originally fled.¹³ While Germany's observed commitment to abide by the Geneva Convention is noteworthy, the recent tendency to shrug off its share of the asylum burden-sharing suggests the German asylum policy may not be sustainable throughout Europe.

The Italian Asylum System:

While immigration policy is a contentious subject of political debate in Italy, data suggests that the refugee and asylum problem is much smaller in Italy than in Germany. With only 0.7 refugees per 1,000 citizens compared with a ratio of 7 to 1,000 in Germany, Italy seems to have found a possible solution to its asylum dilemma.¹⁴

The Italian solution lies in the 1998 Turco-Napolitano law, which was later updated with the Bossi-Fini law in 2002. One provision of these laws allowed for holding centers to be set up in the major Italian ports of entry like Lampedusa, ostensibly to better process the rising number of people arriving by boat, many of whom request asylum upon arrival.¹⁵ However, the centers drew criticism from human rights groups as well as from the European Union. The mass expulsion of more than a thousand immigrants and asylum seekers to Libya,¹⁶ a non-signatory to the Geneva Convention, suggested that Italy was guilty of violating the principle of non-refoulement.

A report by the Human Rights Watch asserts that not only is Italy guilty of refoulement, but the Italian Coast Guard and FRONTEX, an EU body similar to the U.S. Border Patrol, forced boats filled with immigrants and potential asylees to turn back to Libya where third-country nationals were "detained in inhuman and degrading conditions and

13 Heuser, Stefan. "Is There a Right to Have Rights? The Case of the Right of Asylum." *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*. Vol. 11, No. 1. Feb. 2008. <http://www.springerlink.com/content/174h457964157002/fulltext.html>. 22 March 2010.

14 UNHCR-I Rifugiati in Italia. 2009 <http://www.unhcr.it/news/dir/30/view/176/scheda-09-17600.html>. 27 March 2010.

15 Andrijasevic, Rutvica. "Deported: The Right to Asylum at EU's External Border of Italy and Libya." *International Migration*; Feb2010, Vol. 48 Issue 1, p148-174.

16 Ibid.


12 Post, Dorothee; Niemann, Arne. "The Europeanisation of German Asylum Policy and the Germanisation of European Asylum Policy: The Case of the Safe Third Country Concept." *Conference Papers -- International Studies Association; 2008 Annual Meeting*. <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=42973125&site=ehost-live>. 22 March 2010.

abused.”¹⁷ Efforts to intercept and reroute migrant-laden boats back to Africa has become the new Italian asylum policy, and it effectively prevents the immigrants the possibility to lodge a claim for asylum. Italian officials assert that all requests for asylum are properly dealt with and their designation of Libya as a safe third country means they are not guilty of refoulement.¹⁸ However, with Italy’s dubious record of commitment to upholding the tenets of the Geneva Convention in the past 20 years, Italy does not seem to have the ideal policy to be implemented throughout Europe.

The Spanish Asylum Policy:

The Spanish asylum policy is very similar to its Italian counterpart. In response to increased immigration, mostly from Western Africa, the Spanish government amplified its efforts to intercept and return migrant boats bound for the coasts of Spain before applications for asylum could be lodged.¹⁹ While the Canary Islands are to Spain what Lampedusa is to Italy, the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla present a unique situation for Spain. Situated on the Northern coast of Morocco, these cities became part of the European Union and thus the Schengen Free Movement Zone along with Spain in the 1990s. These changes coincided with many sub-Saharan crises happening at the time

and created a convenient destination for asylum seekers. Not having to cross the Mediterranean Sea, asylum seekers arrived in droves. Spain’s response was to construct a double-layered six-meter-tall electrified fence, which is eight kilometers along the border of Ceuta and Morocco



and ten kilometers along the border of Melilla and Morocco. The fences are protected by razor wire and tear gas traps; they are monitored by video and spotlight, as well as heat, movement, and noise sensors.²⁰ As is done with migrants at sea, many asylum seekers who come to the gates are turned back before they can apply for asylum.²¹

Since these asylees cannot move forward to Europe and are not able to return to their home countries, communities which can be described as “third nations” have developed at their borders. These “third nations” are home to the unfortunate groups

17 Human Rights Watch. “Pushed Back, Pushed Around: Italy’s Forced Return of Boat Migrants and Asylum Seekers, Libya’s Mistreatment of Migrants and Asylum Seekers”

18 UNHCR-I Rifugiati in Italia.

19 Sidarto, Linawati. “ECHR Looks at Italy’s Asylum Policy.” Radio Netherlands Worldwide. 10 May 2010. <http://www.rnw.nl/international-justice/article/echr-looks-italy%E2%80%99s-asylum-policy>

20 Cimadomo, Guido & Ponce, Pilar Martinez. “Ceuta and Mililla Fences: A Defensive System?” SARAI Reader. 2006. http://www.sarai.net/publications/readers/06-turbulence/10_guido.pdf 9 May 2010.

21 “Spain/Morocco: Rights of migrants and asylum-seekers still at risk one year after Ceuta and Mililla.” Amnesty International. 26 October 2006. http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR41/011/2006/en/fa_d8b4d1-f9d1-11dd-b1b0-c961f7d9c35/eur410112006en.pdf 10 May 2010.

of people from various nations who cannot obtain rights from the developed world, who have had their rights violated in their home countries, and who are not granted any rights in the country they are in.²²

The rejection of asylum seekers at its doorstep by Spain shows that it, like Italy, is in violation of international migration law and does not have an adequate asylum policy. There is concern that Italian and Spanish efforts to restrict access by sea or easily reached places like Ceuta and Melilla will lead asylum seekers to adopt even more dangerous methods in order to arrive in Europe, resulting in an even greater number of immigrant deaths.²³

Swedish Asylum Policy:

Compared to the other countries analyzed in this paper, Sweden has a very liberal asylum policy. This is not to say that it is without problems. In fact, Sweden is accused of its share of violations and legislation in the last 10 years, showing Sweden moving towards a more restrictive policy.²⁴ Nonetheless, it remains one of the more desirable Scandinavian destinations for asylum seekers. It is also one of the easiest European nations in which to gain refuge due to Swedish Aliens Act of 2006, which expands the concept of refugee under Swedish law. In Sweden a person may be granted asylum if they can prove a well-founded fear of capital punishment, torture, war, environmental disasters, or persecution based on sex or sexual orientation.²⁵ These criteria go well beyond what is stipulated in the Geneva Convention.

22 Cimadomo, Guido et al.

23 "The European Union must change its immigration and asylum policy." European Association for the Defense of Human Rights. April 2009. <http://www.aedh.eu/plugins/fckeditor/userfiles/file/Communiqu%C3%A9s/The%20European%20Union%20must%20change%20its%20immigration%20and%20asylum%20policy.pdf> 5 May 2010

24 Khosravi, Shahram. "Sweden: Detention and Deportation of Asylum Seekers." *Race & Classe*. Apr-Jun 2009. Vol. 50 Issue 4, p38-36.

25 Asylum-Regeringskansliet-Government offices of Sweden. <http://www.aedh.eu/plugins/fckeditor/userfiles/file/Communiqu%C3%A9s/The%20European%20Union%20must%20change%20its%20immigration%20and%20asylum%20policy.pdf> 12 May 2010

This decade has seen the beginning of the debate as to whether Sweden's welfare system will be sustainable into the future, as 12% of the population is foreign-born and has high levels of unemployment and growing welfare-dependency.²⁶ Because Sweden does not automatically grant citizenship to the children born on its soil to parents of migrant origin, some wonder to which rights those children are entitled. In light of Europe's current economic woes, the idea to deny some or all facets of the social-welfare system to immigrants has been proposed.²⁷

Policy Recommendation:

The priority member states tend to place on their national interest over a fair treatment of asylum seekers, and the lack of adequate compulsion to abide by the Geneva Convention, implies that the policy which best meets the rights of both asylum seekers and the member states is to be found at the level of the European Union. A successful implementation of the Common European Asylum System will guarantee the security concerns member states currently hold while vastly improving the treatment asylum seekers receive in Europe. Currently, member states are suspicious of states with weak migration policy and enforcement. The fear is that a state with a lax asylum policy will give refuge to terrorists and that when they are granted citizenship, the terrorists will be granted free movement to all other member states, as per the free movement of people across European borders afforded in the Schengen Agreement. A common asylum system that all nations can agree upon should help to mitigate this concern.

To better unify the immigration systems of EU member states, the second Dublin Regulation instituted the Eurodac program, which is a computerized database consisting of the fingerprints of asylum seekers used to determine whether a migrant has applied for asylum in another European territory. Recent proposals to amend the program have been introduced to help allay the

26 Westin, Charles. "Sweden: Restrictive Immigration Policy and Multiculturalism." Migration Information Source. June 2006. <http://www.migrationinformation.org/usfocus/display.cfm?ID=406> 12 May 2010.

27 Khosravi.

fears that the asylum system may be exploited by terrorists.²⁸ However, there are debates in Europe as to whether the Eurodac in its current form is ethical due to the implied criminality it imposes on asylum seekers (in most of Europe, only criminals are fingerprinted and the point is made that requesting asylum is not a crime).²⁹

Efforts by the CEAS to rein in pull factors influencing illegal and economic migration combined with efforts to curb push factors in the countries of origin are applauded though, to date, show little success. Also, restrictions must be placed on third country ruling to prevent chain rulings from causing any instance of refolement.

This paper recommends that the CEAS program coordinate its efforts on asylum policy with various IGOs and NGOs, especially the UNHCR, the International Organization on Migration, and the European Council on Refugees and Exiles. The combined experience and similar goals that these organizations possess allow them to easily identify and meet the needs of asylum seekers. Greater transparency is also needed in organizations such as national boarder securities and FRONTEX in order to reduce any abuse potential asylees may meet under their jurisdictions. If followed, these recommendations should reconcile the concerns of member states with the right to asylum to which all people are entitled.



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28 Brouwer, E.R. "Eurodac: Its Limitations and Temptations." *European Journal of Migration & Law*; Apr 2002, Vol. 4 Issue 2, p231-247, 17p. <http://ida.lib.uidaho.edu:2048/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=12509908&site=ehost-live>.

29Ibid.



Child Trafficking through Latin America

Region-Specific Policy Considerations for Strengthening Judicial and Law Enforcement Suppression of Child Trafficking through Latin America
– Elisa M. Briesmeister

With rising international consciousness of modern child trafficking, research attention and suppression efforts primarily center on Southeast Asia, as it is a destination for sex tourism. Yet, Latin Americans comprise the second-largest population of trafficked persons in the world.¹ Global statistics

range from 2.5 million trafficked into forced labor² at any given time, to 27 million in slavery-like conditions.³ One-fifth of Latin America's forced laborers – 250,000 men, women and children⁴ – are trafficked intra-regionally and internationally from countries rife with violence and poverty, like Colombia and the Dominican Republic.⁵ Thematically, 40 to 50 percent of trafficked persons are under 18 years old, and psycho-physical development outcomes for these 100,000 children are abysmal, presenting Latin American nations with public health and security risks.

One barrier to suppressing this risk is a simple confusion of motives. Since causes of forced and economic migration might be very similar, the resulting migration processes are difficult to distinguish. They may include similar routes, means of transport, or use of common smugglers.⁶ For this reason, it is necessary to clarify: our primary concern is with trafficking in persons (TIP),⁷ which can be plainly differentiated from smuggling by understanding forced versus voluntary movement.⁸

Latin American TIP (la trata de personas in Spanish), specifically in children, takes various forms

2 *ibid*

3 Bales, Kevin. *Disposable People*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004.

4 *Human Trafficking: the Facts*. UN.GIFT, the Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking. Web. 8 May 2010. <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/labour/Forced_labour/HUMAN_TRAFFICKING_-_THE_FACTS_-_final.pdf>.

5 U.S. Department of State. see appendix Table 1 for a complete list of countries of Origin, Transit, and Destination

6 Collyer, Michael. "The Search for Solutions: achievements and challenges." *International Migration Review* 40.2 (Summer 2006): 454. Web. 2 Mar. 2010.

7 The United Nations carefully qualifies these definitions to underscore consent, and legal consent cannot be given unless the consenter is of age 18, thus any harbor, transport, or receipt of a child for the *purpose of exploitation*, irrespective of means to supposed consent, is considered trafficking.

8 The Palermo Protocols on "trafficking" and "smuggling" in persons, by the UNODC, would specify that traffickers utilize threat, force or coercion, fraud or deception, and/or the abuse of a position of power to achieve the consent of a person for the purpose of exploitation, whereas smugglers receive remuneration for illegal migration under consent not obtained by use of coercion or deception. (UN Office on Drugs and Crime's Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. 2000, found at <http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf>)

1 ILO Key Statistics on Forced Labour. International Labour Organization, 2007. Web. 4 May 2010. <<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/asro/manila/downloads/flstats.pdf>>

with insidious exploitation as its undercurrent. Beyond widely-practiced Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children (CSEC), victims are defrauded or coerced into mining and agricultural labor, organized crime, drug gangs and guerilla conflicts, illegal adoptions, and domestic servitude. According to the ILO, with regard to intra-regional forced labor, "30,000 children⁹ were forced into armed conflict and a staggering 750,000 children work in prostitution."¹⁰ Child exploitation through trafficking is a pervasive and multifaceted form of abuse that can neither be suppressed unilaterally nor explained by one solitary cause.

Despite major contributions in nearly every country¹¹ by the human rights movement over the past half-decade to criminalize this type of abuse, public justice systems fail to deliver protection to the vulnerable. Latin American civil courts are notoriously time-consuming, and another of the greatest hindrances to suppressing child trafficking in this developing region is the struggle faced by everyday citizens to escape what Gary Haugen and Victor Boutros call "functional lawlessness: the struggle to avoid extortion ...by local police [or] being thrown arbitrarily into an overcrowded, disease-ridden jail with little or no prospect of a fair trial."¹²

Though regional governments are aware of domestic child trafficking, many countries – namely Haiti, Honduras and Guatemala – find "bigger fish to fry" in the problems of drug trafficking and gang violence and choose to allocate their funds here first,¹³ thereby presenting themselves with another barrier to suppression. Ironically, these issues are increasingly and inextricably entangled, and instead

of overlooking TIP to hurry toward suppressing the stated "bigger fish", perhaps these governments could turn to the very same solutions being pursued for narcotics and small arms trafficking.

Law Enforcement-Based Solutions

Preexisting trafficking networks and methodologies for narcotics and small arms are often used as routes for recruitment and traffic of persons. Combining this with public corruption and inconsistent law enforcement, Latin American countries face especially insurmountable odds unless they train law enforcement officers to (a) react swiftly when they encounter perpetrators of organized or ad-hoc trafficking crimes, (b) refuse bribery and act justly, and (c) recognize children being trafficked and secure their safety so they can seek appropriate legal and psychological aftercare services.

A region-specific training mechanism: THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE

An inroad to solving child trafficking may exist in a regional mechanism that follows the same patterns and pathways directly associated with drug/arms trafficking, money laundering, and other organized criminal activity. The Mérida Initiative (hereinafter, "Mérida"), established between the US and Mexico and Central America in 2007, was the first multi-governmental collaborative effort to tackle such border-transcending humanitarian problems in the Western Hemisphere. Spearheaded by the US, it is not a standalone cash-payment system. Rather, it reinforces a cooperative strategy to equip and capacitate law enforcement and military forces through technical collaboration, equipment provision, and training programs.¹⁴ Still, Mérida has already received intense criticism surrounding funding allocation (Fig. 3) and the need to protect human rights as police and military become involved in suppressing drugs and arms traffic.

[Congressional] policy debates...include what levels and types of funding should be provided to Mexico and Central America; how well the interagency

9 boys 15-17 years old

10 2002 estimates by ILO in van de Glind, H, & Kooijmans, J. (2008). Modern-day child slavery. *Children & Society*, 22(3), 150-166. Retrieved from <http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119409316/HTMLSTART>

11 Haugen, Gary, and Victor Boutros. "And Justice For All: Enforcing Human Rights for the World's Poor." 51-62. *Foreign Affairs* 3.89 (May/June 2010): Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. 4 May 2010. <http://www.ijm.org/foreignaffairs-article-01>.

12 *ibid*

13 Seelke, Clare Ribando. *Trafficking in Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean*. RL33200. [Washington, D.C.]: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2009.

14 Olson, Eric L. *Six Key Issues in U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation*. Issue brief. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, Mexico Institute, 2009. Print.

community...is implementing the Initiative; and the degree to which the nations involved, including the United States, are fulfilling their domestic obligations.¹⁵

Especially due to the sensitivities of human beings in vulnerable situations, it would be imperative to reconsider certain police methodologies associated with suppressing arms and drug traffic when extending Mérida to respond to TIP. To effectively address shortcomings in judicial structure, participating governments could consider reallocating funds in favor of demonstrated domestic action steps to strengthen the currently civil¹⁶ legal system. Strengthening legal structure in step with law enforcement is a concept discussed later and is supported by numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who specialize in combating trafficking.¹⁷

Counterbalancing Police Corruption

The International Justice Mission (IJM) utilizes and promotes an innovative partnership between NGOs and police forces to address trafficking at the municipal level with methods relevant to each distinct cultural scenario. Haugen and Boutros conceptualized "rule-of-law aid" to support those officials directly involved in enforcing the law on behalf of trafficked children. This starts with material resources that give social workers, police, prosecutors, and judges ground-level, practical casework training and "the basic tools of their trade" (an idea founded in offsetting logistical deficiencies in the developing world¹⁸). It also creates accompanying social services and legal aid for the poor. "Cultivating the political will and capacity of the police" (and of others), perhaps

through providing financial assistance for higher salaries, might diminish petty corruption. Though expensive implements, they argue that such an investment represents a small fraction of the development aid lost in corrupt law-enforcement systems today.¹⁹

Strengthening Judicial Superstructures

Rising in global preeminence is the judicial approach to combating trafficking in persons. In Latin America, just as in Europe, most judicial systems rely upon codification of written law (i.e., referencing the constitution). The problem with many Latin American systems is that they are antiquated and, as in the days of colonialism, benefit those in power, complicating the judicial superstructure and providing little application to modern realities. Since 2000, several key statutory definitions have been written and disseminated on an international level, including the Palermo Protocols on Trafficking and Smuggling as well as the United States' Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA). Still, much of the judicial change that has occurred is only ratified at the federal level, and even worse, some of these modifications give no direct reference to trafficking at all.

Palermo Protocols

This analysis would be incomplete without acknowledging the immense importance of an internationally recognized standard for defining the problems of smuggling and trafficking, and especially for distinguishing between the two. Drafted in 2000, the "Palermo Protocols"²⁰ serve as this standard under mutual agreement by UN member nations. They define "smuggling" as the procurement of illegal entry for a (nonresident) migrant when the smuggler obtains financial or other material benefit. Here, "illegal entry" means crossing borders without complying with the requirements for legal entry into the receiving state. While related, trafficking remains a separate entity,

15 Seelke, Clare Ribando. *Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues*, R40135. [Washington, D.C.]: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2009.

16 "Juriglobe- World Legal Systems" map. University of Ottawa Faculty of Law, 2009. Web: <http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/apropos/index.php>

17 Namely, International Justice Mission, Shared Hope International, *inter alia*.

18 Guinn, David E. "Defining the Problem of Trafficking: The Interplay of US Law, Donor, and NGO Engagement and the Local Context in Latin America." *Human Rights Quarterly* 30 (2008): 129. Johns Hopkins University Press. Web. 2 Apr. 2010.

19 And Justice for All, 61

20 Formally referred to as the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, UNODC, 2000.

especially with regard to children, as discussed earlier. The trafficking protocol thusly delineates activities associated with trafficking: prostitution or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery and practices similar to slavery, and the removal of organs after homicide.

TVPA

Building upon the Palermo foundation, the United States devised the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA; reauthorized through 2011) as a mechanism to predicate foreign aid disbursements, contingent upon governments' demonstrated compliance with initiatives to curb TIP within country. Every year, the US Department of State administers a statistical TIP Report²¹ to rank countries on their progress. Haugen and Boutros suggest that this is positive:

To push this along, developed-country governments should link their international development assistance to the willingness of developing-country governments to improve their public justice systems. ...Such a strategy is already working its way through the U.S. Congress: the Child Protection Compact Act would authorize U.S. government grants to developing countries that have demonstrated a commitment to combating child trafficking...measured by concrete benchmarks. Likewise, [the U.S.] and other governments in the developed world should cut off or limit foreign aid to countries that are unwilling to improve their capacity to protect the poor from abuse and violence—especially since rampant lawlessness is likely to make any such assistance unproductive in the first place.

Semantics on the Border

With regard to immigration and questions of "smuggling versus trafficking", many scholars and policy makers are examining intra-regional immigration policy as a possible cause (and hopeful solution) to inter-Latin American trafficking. As Michael Collyer says:

Given the growing difficulties of both legal and illegal migration to...North America...smuggling and trafficking have become the only way in

which many people are able to reach their chosen destination. In certain areas, trafficking of migrants, distinguished from smuggling by the use of force or coercion, may itself produce, rather than be a response to, forced migration.²²

This is seen specifically in gateway countries with strategic borders, e.g. Colombia and Mexico, where immigration policies tend to restrict migration into destination countries (such as Panama or the United States) and neglect to monitor migration sites in source countries (like Guatemala or Nicaragua).

A Model Law

Many countries in Latin America have acceded to the Palermo Protocol and even the TVPA but still lack special laws addressing trafficking. "Instead, insofar as they address the problem as required under their ratification of the Palermo Protocol or the [CRC Protocol²³], they do so through statutes directed against the sexual exploitation of children (e.g. Mexico) or prohibitions against procurement (e.g. Brazil)," reports Guinn.²⁴

National efforts to emphasize trafficking in legislation can be and are being assisted by intergovernmental organizations with certain expertise. One international initiative undertaken by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is their Model Law against Trafficking in Persons. This procedure allows the UNODC to assist states in implementing the provisions contained in the Palermo Protocol by adopting new, unambiguous laws and to facilitate the review and amendment of existing legislation.

Preferred Approach

Specific laws related to the criminalization of traffickers and prosecution of people voluntarily smuggled – emphasizing the protection of those

22 The Search for Solutions: achievements and challenges, 455.

23 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography, (*entered into force* 18 Jan. 2002). G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (2000)

24 Defining the Problem of Trafficking: The Interplay of US Law, Donor, and NGO Engagement and the Local Context in Latin America, 138.


21 Available at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/123357.pdf>

trafficked – will require international human rights consensus but need to be formulated according to national jurisprudence and values throughout Latin America. At the state level, government elites and law enforcement officials must learn to enforce existing laws and form new ones according to current realities. With advice from international NGOs with legal expertise or governments in partnership, countries with weak justice systems can endeavor to first adjust their methodologies and then deepen them to include legislation, and the just enforcement thereof, at provincial and municipal levels. Since international diplomats and national policymakers often influence the agendas for law enforcement personnel, their involvement in suppressing trafficking will be encouraged by a combination of TVPA-style aid disbursement directives and a reinvented Mérida Initiative.

Mérida Extended

This new model for the Mérida Initiative would extend throughout Latin America and cooperate to establish an international inter-agency task force to combat trafficking along the roads already traveled to combat trade in drugs and small arms. Ideally, it would be driven by Latin America and would communicate values unique to this region with financial support and guidance offered by more developed countries in the Western Hemisphere, namely the United States and Canada. The

overarching goal of an extended Mérida would be to take advantage of the intelligence, equipment, and cooperation that have already been forged under the 2008 Mérida Initiative in efforts to suppress other forms of organized crime. In so doing, Latin American law enforcement personnel and related officials could be equipped to effectively manage the threats posed by child trafficking in the region. “Effective management” would be comprised of credible, appropriately harsh punishment for traffickers within the law enforcement sector while legislation is updated to officially criminalize trafficking and police corruption in the justice system.

A problem as pervasive and multifaceted as child trafficking in Latin America begs a response that might appear complex in planning but is clear in follow-through. The lessons learned by the United States, Mexico, and Central America may be extended throughout Latin America, and appropriate modifications to this already functioning suppression methodology can be sought. Only then, as the law enforcement sector aligns with a revived judicial system, will effective prosecution and punishment for traffickers and protection for child victims take shape. 

Appendix

Table 1: Intra-regional Latin American Trafficking¹

Country	Source	Transit	Destination
Argentina		X	X
Brazil		X	X
Bolivia		X	X
Chile		X	
Costa Rica		X	X
Colombia	X	X	X
Dominican Republic	X	X	X
Guatemala	X	X	
Haiti	X	X	
Honduras	X	X	
Mexico	X	X	
Nicaragua	X	X	
Panama		X	X
Paraguay	X	X	

Figure 2: Traffic through Colombia





Figure 3: Funding the Mérida Initiative

Bush Administration Requests for Mérida Initiative (In millions of US\$)



Group 1: Counter-narcotics, Counterterrorism, Border Security
Group 2: Public Security and Law Enforcement
Group 3: Institution Building and Rule of Law

Figure 1: World Legal Systems²⁵



(Footnotes)

¹ Compiled by author in synthesis of research

²⁵ Juriglobe



Promoting Sustainable Agriculture in the Baltic States

– Alexis Olson

Background

In the years following World War II, the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were incorporated into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and subjected to the far-reaching commonalities imposed by the Soviet regime. The “Sovietization” and policy of commonality extended into the agricultural sector of the region as farmlands were appropriated by the State and converted into state farms. For over forty years, agricultural production was characterized by a high

degree of state intervention.¹ Production practices were ineffectual and food shortages, rationing, and rural poverty pervaded. Soviet agriculture was “notoriously inefficient,” and many regarded the transition to a market-oriented system as the cure to the “chronic inefficiency.”²

After independence in 1991, the Baltic states transitioned from a planned to a market economy. In the agricultural sector, this included such measures as the liquidation of state monopolies, redistribution and privatization of farmland, liberalization of producer and food prices, and the withdrawal of input and food subsidies.³ Coupled with a lack of capital that caused a sudden drop in agricultural investment, the agricultural industry faced devastating setbacks in the 1990s.⁴ To exacerbate the problem, “taxes, fees, and hygiene restrictions limited the possibilities to export agricultural products to the countries of the European Union.”⁵ The most acute problem was “the presence of widespread rural unemployment and of an underproductive and over-populated agricultural labor force.”⁶

Baltic state integration into the European Union (EU) began shortly after independence. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were required to adopt the *Acquis Communautaire*, the total body of European Union law which included the integration of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), into the already-struggling agricultural sector in the Baltic States. It was believed that “accession to the EU [would] make more resources

1 Fernández, Javier. “The Common Agricultural Policy and EU Enlargement: Implications for Agricultural Production in the Central and Eastern European Countries.” Presented at the Xth EEAE Congress, Zaragoza (Spain), 28-31 August 2002.

2 Lerman, Zvi, Csaba Csaki, and Gershon Feder. *Agriculture in Transition: Land Policies and Evolving Farm Structures in Post-Soviet Countries*. United Kingdom: Lexington Books, 2004

3 Fernández, 2002.

4 “Agriculture and the Environment in the EU Accession Countries: Implications of Applying the EU Common Agricultural Policy.” European Environment Agency. *Environmental Issue Report*, No. 37: 2004.

5 Steineck, Staffan, Per Ståhltnacke, Stefan Löfgren, and Arne Gustafson. “Agricultural Development and Nutrient Flows in the Baltic States and Sweden after 1988.” *Ambio*, Vol. 28, No. 4: June 1999. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4314903>>. 27 April 2010.

6 Fernández, 2002.

available for agri-environmental schemes and other rural development measures.⁷ Under the CAP, however, agriculture in the Baltic States continued to struggle. The Pillar I subsidies and price support mechanisms that were functioning in Western Europe led the Baltic States to intensify their agricultural practices at the cost of social and environmental stability in order to compete with and meet the objectives set for the rest of the EU.

Maintain the Status Quo

Since 2004, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have seen little improvement in their agricultural sectors. Environmentally, they face problems with pollution, soil degradation, greenhouse emissions, ecosystem destruction, and water supply quality and quantity. Economically, agricultural stability is inhibited by issues with food security and agricultural production costs and efficiency. Socially, these countries face the highest levels of poverty of all European Union Member States; Latvia's current unemployment rate is 21%, Lithuania's is 19%, and Estonia's is also 19%.⁸ They are, furthermore, plagued by pronounced rural poverty, rural unemployment, and poor working conditions in the agricultural industry. Maintaining the status quo in the Baltic states is certainly an option. However, current conditions suggest that some immediate action is necessary to address these crises.

The emerging institution of sustainable agriculture is one of the most effective means for holistically combating the social, economic, and environmental problems that aggravate the Baltic states, with particular regard to rural agriculture. The University of California Sustainable Agriculture and Research Center explains, "Not only does sustainable agriculture address many environmental and social concerns, but it offers innovative and economically viable opportunities for growers, laborers, consumers, policy-makers, and many others

in the entire food system."⁹ The question that follows, then, is how sustainable agriculture can be promoted at the regional, national, and local levels to ensure its positive impact.

CAP Reform

One of the most commonly advocated strategies for promoting and implementing sustainable agriculture involves reform of the European Union's Common Agricultural Policy. The CAP is currently divided into two policy and funding categories. The first "Pillar" combines traditional support instruments that are linked to agricultural production. Pillar I contributions consume 80-90% of the total CAP budget annually. The second pillar of the CAP takes the form of Rural Development Programs that must be co-financed by individual Member States.¹⁰

Some suggested reforms involve the restructuring of the mechanisms for determining production levels and budget allocations within Pillar I and Pillar II programs. Some support a system of setting stratified production levels that "incorporate data on the distribution of farms among different size levels and the utilization of different supply elasticities for different farm size intervals."¹¹ This would also require the creation of a database with relevant elasticities and productivity estimates. Others promote a complete reversal of the distribution between Pillar I and Pillar II funding. This reform would provide support to farmers based on active engagement in sustainable agricultural practices rather than support based on production levels.

The World Wildlife Federation (WWF) asserts that the CAP must "shift from an agriculturally focused policy to a broader based environment and rural development policy designed to achieve quality food production, sustainable land management, and rural development." Within the framework of this transition of ideology and

7 European Environment Agency, 2004.

8 Wolff, Pascal. "Populations and Social Conditions" EUROSTAT. 16 June 2009. <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-09-046/EN/KS-SF-09-046-EN.PDF>. 26 April 2010.

9 "What is Sustainable Agriculture?" University of California Sustainable Agriculture Research and Education Program. <<http://www.sarep.ucdavis.edu/concept.htm>>. 26 April 2010.

10 European Environment Agency, 2004.

11 Fernández, 2002.

objective for the agricultural system in Europe, the reformed CAP would “result in a more transparent, equitable, and efficient support system for rural areas and facilitate more market-oriented and less trade-distorting agriculture—it could also support sustainable rural development helping to boost jobs and the rural economy in way that also deliver environmental benefits.”¹² In the short term, the WWF supports increased funding for Pillar II. In the long term, it supports the “phasing-out” of Pillar I funding altogether.

CAP reform is an essential part of stabilizing the agricultural industry in the Baltic region and throughout Europe. Other suggested agri-environmental measures include cross-compliance, good farming practice, farmer advice and training, support for environmental investment, and agri-environment schemes.¹³ The CAP brochure produced by the European Commission on Agriculture and Rural Development assures that, “During the coming years the CAP will change further in order to continue to: promote a sustainable agriculture offering safe, quality products while protecting the environment and animal welfare; support the multifunctional role of farmers as suppliers of public goods to society; and promote the growth and creation of jobs in rural areas.”¹⁴

International Engagement

Social, economic, and environmental cohesion and participation is not possible without political and social structures that reflect and organize at grass roots levels, especially within the rural population. While these efforts exist, however, the vast majority of them are concentrated in urban

locations.¹⁵ Governments and non-governmental organizations can collaborate on a regional basis to attend to issues such as the creation of alternative employment in rural areas, modernization of the agricultural and food sector, improvements in rural infrastructure, and the development of programs featuring incentives to change and correct training and education. Agri-environment planning can have a dramatic, positive effect on the ecological status of agricultural systems as well as the understanding of, and attitudes towards, the environment. Stephen Lintner argues that, “The challenge of managing environmental issues in agriculture and rural settlements can be successfully addressed only through sustained partnership among agricultural, rural, and environmental interests at the regional, national, and local level.”¹⁶

This cooperation exists in the form of Baltic 21, the regional concentration of the global Agenda 21 Sustainable Development Programme through the United Nations. Baltic 21 is considered an “open and transparent network for cooperation” between the eleven Baltic Sea states, the European Commission, numerous IGOs and NGOs, academic and financial institutions, and local, city, and business networks.¹⁷ Though their focus is quite broad, concentration on the agricultural sector, particularly through the use of the “Lighthouse Projects” for development, the Baltic 21 can achieve the goals of sustainable agriculture promotion and implementation.

15 Gorniak, Jaroslaw and Olympios Katsiaouni. “Globalisation an Rural Poverty in Transition Economies.” Paper for Expert Group Meeting on Globalisation and Poverty Reduction: Can the Rural Poor Benefit from Globalisation? Organised by Division for Social Policy and Development, United Nations: 8-9 November 2001, New York.

16 Lintner, Stephen. “Agriculture and the Environment in the Baltic Sea Region: An Agenda for Action.” *Ambio*, Vol. 26, No. 7, The Royal Colloquium. The Baltic Sea Region: Agriculture and Sustainability: November 1997. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4314636>>. 27 April 2010.

17 “Expert Group on Sustainable Development—Baltic 21.” Council of the Baltic Sea States. <<http://www.cbss.org/Environment/baltic-21>>. 24 April 2010.

12 “WWF Position on Sustainable Agriculture and CAP Reforms.” World Wildlife Federation. July 2008. <<http://wwf-ue-2008.org/download/9/>>. 26 April 2010.

13 European Environment Agency, 2004.

14 “The Common Agricultural Policy Explained.” European Commission Agriculture and Rural Development. Brochure. <http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/capexplained/cap_en.pdf>. 26 April 2010.

"Sustainable" Logo

Sustainable agriculture can also be promoted through labeling, packaging, and marketing programs. The EU implemented a system of labeling products to distinguish different specialized regions or production methods. A brochure issued by the EU explains, "The exceptional nature and quality of some products derives from both their place of production and the methods used to make them. Consumers and the food trade are increasingly interested in the geographical origin of food and other characteristics. The EU recognizes this and has developed 'quality logos'." Products bearing the "Protected Designation of Origin" or "Protected Geographical Indication," "Traditional Specialty Guaranteed," or "Organic" logos, have particular characteristics that must meet the standards designated by each label.¹⁸ A similar labeling system can be implemented for products produced through "sustainable" agricultural practices, especially in a culture that is increasingly concerned with food origins and production practices.

Educational Programming

On the local level, sustainable agriculture can be effectively promoted through educational programs. An article for the *Journal of Environmental Management* posits, "Traditional Local Knowledge could play an important role, not only in maintaining traditional land-use systems, but in contributing to their adaptation and the development of new sustainable management systems that are able to respond to new and evolving challenges such as climate change, increasing consumption, reduced availability of external inputs and biodiversity loss."¹⁹ There is currently no mechanism for transferring knowledge between land managers, policy makers, and rural populations. Some of the strategies for bridging this gap include the extension of the Baltic 21 Ecosystem Health and Sustainable Agriculture (EHSA) program to incorporate extension service

and outreach as well as youth education programs. The EHSA is a Lighthouse Project that created an academic curriculum in the field of sustainable agriculture. It has been integrated into the Baltic University Programme in order to transfer knowledge through seminars and training courses, and develop educational packages on sustainable agriculture, land use, rural development, and ecosystem health and management.²⁰

The Baltic states have established the foundation of knowledge and resources necessary to extend the educational programming. The next dimension incorporates educational programs for both rural and urban youth as well as extension services for current farmers. Youth programs through EHSA, modeled after the National FFA Organization in the United States, could promote positive change for future generations. Providing enhanced extension services to rural farmers would create a network for knowledge sharing that is currently nonexistent in the agricultural sector.

Social Networking

Another increasingly popular trend in the globalized world is the use of social networking technology as a forum for social and political interaction. Terri Willard points to mobile communications, online social networking, and social media as promising options. As new information technologies are developed, it is widely recognized that social networking and media have the ability to raise awareness of issues, improve monitoring of environmental and social realities, and serve as a tool for political action. Linking together individual members, groups, events, and pages enable individuals to learn about new ideas and social movements as their friends and colleagues become involved in them.²¹

There are currently Social Network Sites (SNSs) specifically dedicated to sustainable development that spread information and knowledge through

18 "The Common Agricultural Policy Explained."

19 Stoate, C., A. Báldi, et. al. "Ecological Impact of Early 21st Century Agricultural Change in Europe: A Review." *Journal of Environmental Management*, 91: 2009.

20 "EHSA: Ecosystem Health and Sustainable Agriculture." Homepage. 8 February 2008. <<http://www.balticuniv.uu.se/ehsa/>>. 26 April 2010.

21 Willard, Terri. "Social Networking and Governance for Sustainable Development." International Institute for Sustainable Development. March 2009. <<http://www.iisd.org/>>. 26 April 2010.

what is called online “social contagion.” SNSs empower viral marketing of ideas, events, and organizations. In fact, the largest online SNS dedicated to sustainable development has attracted over 230,000 members and its website is available in twelve languages. Social Networking Sites promoting sustainable agriculture could be utilized to increase the support of the other European Union member states and encourage investment in the rural and agricultural sectors in the Baltic region. Benefits for sustainable agriculture are many:

- Values and principles are diffused through peer networks
- Specialized knowledge becomes more visible to entire population
- Small-scale issues and local concerns may gain a global audience more rapidly
- Issues and solutions go viral quickly
- Disciplinary gaps may be more easily bridged
- Interagency and intergovernmental social networking sites can promote cooperation across government.²²


Social networking sites can also be used to influence governance for sustainable development through information sharing about political campaigns, elections, and agendas in the Baltic region. With communication comes the foundation for relationship and collaborative action, and information technology provides a conduit for the exchange of information between science disciplines, agriculturalists, and policy makers across Europe.

Recommended Strategy

Educational programming and extension services, carefully managed by a steering group consisting of representatives from, and working within, the mandate of the Baltic 21, are the most promising routes to sustainable agriculture in the Baltic states. Baltic 21, as a regional organization, has intimate knowledge of the economic, social,

and environmental problems unique to each country. Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia would benefit from the support of the other Baltic Sea States (including Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Russia, and Sweden). They will also enjoy the direct connection to the European Union established by the representative from the European Commission.

Educational programs, whether through school curriculum or in the form of extension services in non-academic settings, are the most effective way to instill the values and practices of sustainable agriculture in the population. Furthermore, if these programs are provided to both rural and urban communities and people understand the inextricable link between sustainable development, sustainable agriculture, and the future of their countries and livelihoods, a national and regional movement toward sustainable agriculture could emerge and carry the Baltic States away from the current problems they face. These programs could be implemented in every level of youth education to ensure future generations of agriculturalists have been educated in the foundations of sustainable agriculture.

These efforts could be supplemented by increased information technology infrastructure and the use of Social Networking Sites to disseminate information and serve as a forum for information sharing and public discourse. Sustainable agriculture and a regional consciousness of sustainable rural development could stabilize the agricultural industry, provide employment opportunities, combat the problems of inadequate water supply quality and quantity, slow the growing poverty rates, and reverse the causes and effects of pollution, soil degradation, greenhouse gas emissions, and ecosystem destruction. Sustainable agriculture can work toward a future where the environmental, social, and economic problems in the Baltic States Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are solved. 

²² Willard, 2009.

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Global Infectious Disease and U.S. National Security

– Lynn McAlister

Introduction

Near the end of 2006, Indonesia refused to share H5N1 Avian Influenza virus samples with the World Health Organization (WHO). Samples are vital to develop vaccines, update diagnostic reagents and test kits, and track the movement and mutation of viruses. Earlier in the year, the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Network provided samples of H5N1 from infected Indonesians to an Australian pharmaceutical company which developed vaccines accordingly. The Indonesian health minister, Siti Fadillah Supari, angry that Australia was never required to obtain permits to produce a vaccine using the Indonesian strain, argued it was unfair to use Indonesia's biological material and then market the vaccine at a price the country could not afford. Ultimately, Supari

protested the WHO's decision to allow commercial use of Indonesian virus samples and justified her argument with intellectual property rights and social justice rhetoric.¹ Using this strategy, the country was able to effectively stop sample-sharing with the WHO and its affiliated health surveillance networks. Other developing countries, including Thailand, India, and Brazil, supported Indonesia's position, agreeing that global health security programs accomplished little for the people of their own countries, given inequitable pharmaceutical distribution in the case of an outbreak.²

Especially in Indonesia, viral surveillance activities are crucial. One-third of the H5N1 cases confirmed in the last eight years were in Indonesia.³ Furthermore, over half of the infections in the current outbreak have been fatal, and the virus has claimed the lives of an unusually high number of healthy children and young adults.⁴ Officials worry avian influenza could develop into a pandemic, similar to the influenza pandemic of 1918 which killed at least 40 million people.⁵ Furthermore, research⁶ on infectious diseases that emerged between 1940 and 2004 confirms a majority of their origins were in Central Africa and Southeast Asia. These "emerging disease hotspots" are consequently where surveillance and response capacity is weakest.⁷ Indonesia's unwillingness to cooperate with health surveillance activities exposes a weakness within international health policy that poses a threat to global health in general and to U.S. national health security in particular.

Objective

Questions that come out of this affair are, first, what U.S. programs exist to deal with global emerging infections? This paper focuses on advising the U.S. since its program is well-funded and the U.S. is a global superpower. Thus it sets the tone for how other countries and even the WHO approach global infectious disease threats. Prevention is given significant emphasis in the stated U.S. plan, and the Department of Defense administers the programs that deal with global emerging infectious diseases. How do they understand and approach prevention? And currently, how is the global health community dealing with the situation created by

Indonesia? Finally, given that this paper advises the U.S. Department of Defense with the Indonesian situation in mind, how can the U.S. alter its surveillance and response activities to bolster U.S. national security? To this end, this paper investigates ways in which the U.S. Department of Defense can both increase disease surveillance compliancy among developing nations and curtail infectious disease threats to U.S. national security by funding preventative health projects through surveillance centers.

Background

The WHO Global Alert and Response System plays a major role in responding to public health emergencies, and it operates under the justification that "health is a shared responsibility, involving equitable access to essential care and collective defense against transnational threats."⁸ Similarly, the United States understands global health as a national security issue. The U.S. Department of Defense Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System (DoD GEIS), a division of the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, operates in partnership with the WHO in the fight against emerging infections.⁹

Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-7 spurred the development of the DoD GEIS in 1997. The directive called for stronger global disease surveillance and response policy in order to protect the health of American citizens.¹⁰ The DoD GEIS "is designed to strengthen the prevention of, surveillance of, and response to infectious diseases that...present a risk to U.S. national security."¹¹ In fiscal year 2008, the DoD GEIS conducted global emerging infection surveillance and response activities with 39 partners in 111 countries. GEIS workers regularly collect thousands of samples from sick and deceased people and use their extensive laboratory system to analyze the samples and predict infectious disease outbreaks. When a dangerous infectious disease is detected, they respond by alerting various national and international organizations, which respond by directing quarantine efforts and public health interventions. The DoD GEIS, along with the WHO, communicates with industry to develop vaccines.¹²

Analysis

While the DoD GEIS works to prevent infectious disease from *spreading*, it does nothing to prevent disease from infecting humans in the first place. Though its stated mission emphasizes the centrality of prevention, no data was found in any of its annual reports¹³ from 1999 to 2008, indicating that it has been involved with preventative projects in surveillance sites. From this analysis, it may be concluded that the DoD GEIS does not fund any preventative projects in areas where surveillance centers are based. Rather, the main goal is to detect emerging infectious diseases. This is a form of prevention, in that it helps prevent DoD beneficiaries – Americans – from becoming infected, if the microbe is detected early enough, but it does nothing to prevent initial infection in surveillance site populations. This approach fails to take into consideration the global dimensions of health in general and of infectious disease in particular.

First, this position reveals the immense amount of faith the DoD GEIS places in its own and its affiliated surveillance partners' ability to locate and isolate infectious agents in every corner of the globe. While this faith is likely overly-optimistic, it is somewhat more founded than the overarching trust in bench science and drug development. The DoD GEIS aims to capture infectious microbes so that pharmaceutical companies can develop products to prevent future infections and, to a lesser degree, treat current ones. There are many reasons to doubt the ubiquitous effectiveness of pharmaceuticals to eradicate devastating human maladies. For example, only two years after the introduction of antibiotics, resistance developed, and presently, antibiotic-resistant forms of tuberculosis¹⁴ and malaria¹⁵ are springing up all over poor areas of the world.¹⁶ Another notable example is HIV/AIDS for which there is still no cure, despite the massive sums of money that are allocated to research and drug development.

Should the United States feel comfortable being completely reliant on surveillance and drug development? Given the potential gravity of an infectious disease epidemic, it appears that Americans are putting 'all of their eggs into one

basket' by relying too heavily on reactionary measures and pharmaceuticals. Noting past and present failures of bench science, in my perspective it would be wise for the U.S. to invest in prevention.

In March 2007, in a failed attempt to persuade Indonesia to re-start H5N1 sample-sharing, the governments of Japan and the United States granted the WHO eight and ten million dollars respectively to be distributed to developing countries for establishing domestic manufacturing capacity for influenza vaccine. Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, Thailand, Vietnam, and India were the recipients of these funds.¹⁷ It was not until the Sixtieth World Health Assembly (WHA) in May 2007, when a resolution calling for fair and equitable sharing of benefits from influenza surveillance programs was published, that Indonesia agreed to resume H5N1 sample sharing.¹⁸ The resolution assured Indonesia that equitable access to vaccines would continue to be addressed by the global health community.¹⁹

The WHA resolution²⁰ reveals the current state of international policy around the issue of inequalities in infectious disease surveillance and response. It calls for continued technology transfer to developing countries so that they can further establish vaccine manufacturing capacity and claims financial aid for these projects should come from member states, donors, vaccine producers, and charitable organizations. This document considers vaccine development to be the most important public health measure for controlling infectious disease. Vaccines have been placed above other projects which have the potential to drastically improve the health of people in poor communities around the world, like reducing poverty and malnutrition, constructing facilities for medical care, and diminishing gender and racial inequalities.²¹

As mentioned above, vaccine development is the sole way the GEIS, the only U.S. government-funded program working for health on a global front, approaches infectious disease threats. GEIS does not fund projects to improve health prior to an outbreak. Just like GEIS surveillance activities, vaccines themselves are reactionary; an infectious microbe must have already infected many people before vaccines are developed.

Through technology transfer programs, the global health community is encouraging the same reactive approach among poor countries and, as a result, pushing them toward complacency in other arenas of public health. Though vaccines are a necessary and effective *component* of public health, environmental preventative measures should be more heavily emphasized.

Basic immunology affirms that good overall health is a major sort of insurance policy against infectious diseases. For example, Abbas and Lichtman (2009) state protein-calorie malnutrition results in deficiencies of virtually all components of the immune system. It inhibits lymphocyte maturation and function, harming innate and adaptive immunity.²² Particularly with regard to novel infectious diseases, immunity is key. The fact that novel infectious diseases are, indeed novel makes them infinitely riskier to human health since no vaccines exist prior to widespread infection.²³

The leading virologist, Stephan S. Morse,²⁴ the Institute of Medicine,²⁵ and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention²⁶ have all published influential pieces that classify novel infections by the factors that lead to their emergence²⁷ rather than by the type of microbe. These factors include: ecological changes from agriculture, deforestation, and dams; human demographic changes including population growth, migration, urban decay, and war; international trade and travel; technology and industry; and breakdowns in public health measures.²⁸

Leaders in the health field understand the social and environmental factors behind emerging infectious diseases. It thus seems anachronistic that the GEIS continues to focus on fighting particular microbes only with pharmaceuticals. The global health community has followed suit, advocating for technology transfer to poor countries. Poor areas of the world certainly need access to vaccines and the latest scientific health advances, but they also need preventative projects that will improve their residents' immunity, as this reduces the likelihood that novel infectious diseases will emerge in the first place.

In addition, if the GEIS and other disease surveillance centers participate in the broader health agenda

in poor nations, scholars²⁹ predict less resistance in carrying out surveillance activities and sample-sharing, as seen in Indonesia. Essentially, by dealing with major global health problems that are not necessarily contagious and thus cannot be transmitted to Americans, the DoD GEIS will be engaging in skillful diplomacy. This paper further asserts that strengthening the immune systems of people in poor countries through broader health agenda participation will decrease the incidence of dangerous novel infectious diseases.

Proposed Policy

Having such a well-funded and globally-integrated surveillance organization places the U.S. in a position to relatively autonomously shape global health development. This clout comes with immense responsibility.

I propose a shift in DoD GEIS activities from global *emerging infections* surveillance to global *health* surveillance. This paper has outlined the connection between health and safety from infectious disease. Ultimately, to be healthy is to be safe. I urge the DoD GEIS to embrace this message and integrate it into their program by creating a system where populations under surveillance have access to funds for preventative public health projects. In this framework, the DoD GEIS would continue to use existing facilities to carry out emerging infections surveillance as usual, but in addition, the program would expand to address health problems endemic to surveillance sites. Areas to concentrate on might include malnutrition, maternal health care, sanitary drinking water systems, hospital and clinic infrastructure, etc.

A positive aspect of current DoD GEIS operations is that they train local people diagnostic lab techniques and epidemiology and employ them in surveillance centers.³⁰ The focus on indigenous workers should be maintained, lest there be public backlash as these programs could come to be seen as a form of health imperialism.^{31, 32} Indigenous and non-indigenous employees of DoD GEIS sites should be encouraged to collaborate in surveying site areas to identify the major public health

problems. They should also be sure to consult with local governments in order to target the most pressing health issues nationally, regionally, and locally.


The funding source for this initiative could be the U.S. Department of Defense budget. Since infectious disease is an eminent threat to U.S. national security, a program focusing on global preventative health would be a justifiable expense. This would also be the most feasible and expedient route to take. I envision a competitive grant-based program in which DoD GEIS employees submit proposals for public health projects around surveillance sites to a central board that reviews proposals annually. The board should include a diverse array of perspectives that vary depending on the projects being proposed. The board should include health workers, non-governmental organizations, government officials in the country where the project will be carried out, engineers, and others whose experience is germane to the proposed project.

Conclusion

Some scholars have suggested that U.S. participation in the broader global health agenda would improve health diplomacy. This type of action would make poor countries more compliant to disease surveillance activities. I agree, and I add further that broader U.S. participation in the form of preventative public health projects would improve the immune systems of people in poor countries, which would help them to better fend off novel infectious diseases. Thus, the benefit of expanded preventative health aid to developing countries is two-fold: improved diplomacy and decreased incidence of infectious disease overall. Both of these benefits would lead to enhanced U.S. national health security.

Indonesia's resistance to sharing avian influenza samples is a loud warning about the limits of international cooperation on health threats when developing countries needs are not addressed. Since a disease anywhere in the world can relatively easily wash up on American shores through trade, travel, wildlife activities, etc., the U.S. must

engage in the broader health agenda of developing countries.

With health and disease, the whole world is intimately connected. In order to keep American citizens safe, the Department of Defense needs to begin thinking in terms of global prevention rather than upholding a reactionary approach to disease. The U.S. must participate in the broader public health agenda in order to continue to gain developing countries' cooperation with disease surveillance activities. Also, drawing on immunological and epidemiological knowledge, we must carry out preventative public health projects of concern to surveillance site populations to prevent the emergence of novel infectious disease threats. 

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Interview with Ambassador Keith Haskell

Ambassador Keith Haskell served in the United Kingdom's Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) for 39 years before retiring in 1999. During his tenure with the British Diplomatic Service, he served in Iraq, Libya, Chile, the United Arab Emirates, West Germany, and in London before becoming an ambassador, first in Peru and later in Brazil. In October 2010, he spent a week at the University of Idaho as the guest of the Martin Institute and Martin School, during which time he guest-lectured in International Studies classes, held office hours to visit informally with students, and delivered a Martin Forum titled "The New Balance of Power in the 21st Century." He sat down with the co-editors of the JMSIS for the following interview:

JMSIS: *In your Martin Forum talk you focused on emerging powers in South America and Asia; what about other regions where you served, the Middle East and Africa?*

KH: The short answer is no, I don't really see any great powers emerging from either of those two regions. It ought to be possible for one of the bigger African states to join the club, as you might say, and probably the best candidate might be Nigeria since it has a large population and it has abundant oil reserves. On the other hand, it has a shambolic government and really high levels of corruption. You remember my mentioning that those were factors which would militate against countries joining the great power league. I don't see Nigeria as a really credible candidate at present [although] maybe it will become so, but it will be a good while, maybe ten years at least. Elsewhere Egypt is the biggest Arab state - it has quite a good technological base, but it's quite a poor country. It does have a little bit of oil and gas but not much and very few other mineral resources. I don't

see that as an aspiring to a great power state. South Africa is probably the most technologically advanced country in Africa at the moment. It has a lot of resources in different fields, but its population is relatively small and particularly the educated population. I think it lacks the technical skills needed to step up to the top level. So the answer is not really.

JMSIS: *What's your opinion on the African Union? Do you see more power coming from the African Union as a whole?*

KH: I don't think so because you've got several member states in the African Union and their interest tends to be very different [from one another]. It's even worse than the European Union, I think. What has been encouraging is that the African Union has provided peacekeepers in areas such as Somalia and Sudan. That's a good step. And there has been some tentative attempt by some members of the African Union to encourage the formation of democratic governments - though what they can do is limiting when so many of their own members don't have democratic governments. But I see it as having limited influence in the same way as the Arab League or the ASEAN or most other regional organizations - the Organization of the American states, for example. They are useful talking shops but that's about all.

JMSIS: *One question that's kind of related more to the Middle East than any place else is in regards to religion. At the wake of the 2003 invasion of Iraq we talked a lot about how it might become Islam versus the west. What do you think of religion as being a major factor in international politics in the near future?*

KH: It is in some areas. Religious fundamentalism is a concern, but not a disaster. When I speak about this to groups I try and distinguish between various levels of religious fundamentalism. There are a very few Muslim fundamentalists who are opposed to the west and to Christianity in any shape or form and whatever happens in the world they will always be enemies, but they are relatively few. The majority of the fundamentalists who support terrorist acts are doing so in pursuit of a political aim - such as settlement of the Palestinian question - and if you can achieve that, then a lot of them can be persuaded to give up support for terrorism and join behind the agreement.

Take, for example, the situation in Ireland where religious fundamentalists in the north and the south were at each other's throats for nearly 30 years. Patient work by Prime Ministers [John] Major and [Tony] Blair and with great help from President [Bill] Clinton and Senator [George] Mitchell, brought the two sides to the negotiating table and a settlement was worked out which didn't give the Catholics all they wanted. It didn't give them the united Ireland, but neither did it go all the way with what the Protestants wanted. [In addition], the Catholics received completely equal rights in Northern Ireland, and on that basis you now have bitter enemies sitting down together in the Northern Ireland assembly and serving as ministers in the Northern Ireland government, which I think twenty years ago people would regard as incredible. There are still a few lunatics on the fringes on both sides who have committed terrorist acts but they are no longer important.

So I think in many ways the Arab/Israel dispute is the key to this; if that could be solved it would starve many of the fundamentalist and terrorist groups of the oxygen to offer their support.

JMSIS: *We would like to move to Europe if we could for a moment. In particular we talked about Russia and the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China as emerging powers in the 21st century); where do you see relations with Russia and Europe going right now? You talked about how it was democratic after the 90's and then [is] now moving away from democracy a bit.*

KH: Well I think no one is quite sure which direction Russia is moving in. It's interesting that there have been one or two hints recently that President [Dmitry] Medvedev is much more behind it than President [Vladimir] Putin was about democracy and freedom of speech and so forth. Everyone thought they he was simply Putin's creature, but he is showing signs of being independent-minded, and if he decides to run for a second term in 2012 when Putin will be eligible to come back for another term at the Presidency that would be very interesting indeed. There are plenty of people in Moscow who would like to see a more democratic, open, tolerant society but at the moment they are in the minority. It's possible that they can get more encouragement in the future. It's equally possible that the current clamp-down will continue. I'm not a Russian expert to see which way it will go. To be frank I don't think anybody knows which way it's going to go.

JMSIS: *Something from your Martin Forum speech comes to mind. You said that roughly 30 years ago, Japan was at the top of the list for rising powers. And obviously with the economic crisis Japan fell back; do you think there are lessons to be learned for other countries that are currently on the BRICs list?*

KH: One is that deflation is much more dangerous to the economy than inflation. Obviously huge inflation is a problem, but moderate inflation is actually beneficial, and the Bank of England targets 2% inflation a year which allows a little bit of leeway one way or the other, and that to me I think is right. The European Central Bank aims for a range between 0-2%, which I think is too low. So that's one thing we have learned from Japan, that deflation is the real danger more than inflation, and that's what caused the crisis of the 1930's to be so long lasting. Among its other problems, of course are what I describe as the demographic deficit: that you have an aging population and a bigger and bigger number of retired people and a smaller and smaller number of people still in the work force who have to support them. Now all the advanced countries have that to a certain extent, but it's far worse in Japan than anywhere else. The United States largely escapes it because of immigration, and the same is true in Britain. But many of the big countries in Europe are facing that problem too - Spain and Germany particularly - but all of them except Britain to some extent. The other thing is that Japan has been, as it were, evicted from its place as the main supplier of industrial and consumer goods in East Asia; there are cheaper, lower-cost producers not only in China, but in Taiwan, Korea and so on - Vietnam and Cambodia even. It maintains its position only by technological intervention now. How long can Japanese industry and science keep that up? So Japan has problems; there is no doubt about that.

JMSIS: *If we pick up that theme of economics, what lessons do you pull from the recent economic crisis, and how do you think that has affected the power structures in the world?*

KH: I don't think it has really affected the world power structure particularly because most countries have been affected by it to a greater or lesser extent. And the majority of countries are beginning to recover now; growth has resumed in the major European economies and the United States. In many parts of the Third World it never stopped—it just slowed down.

JMSIS: We'd like to jump to more talking about the balance of power in the international system. In your speech you talked about trends of hegemony, multi-polarity and bi-polarity and how the world is moving back to multi-polarity now. What kind of policy recommendations or maybe action recommendations do you prescribe for the US and UK to deal with the emerging balance of power?

KH: In my speech, I said that I think the United States and also Britain both have to rebalance their armed forces and perhaps move away from very expensive heavy weapons which were originally conceived for a Cold War conflict that never happened and look at new forms of weaponry to meet new forms of threat. I mentioned the use of unmanned aerial drones in preference to manned fighter aircraft because they are greatly cheaper, and as their capacities develop, they can do more and more of the work that manned aircraft currently do. They can take pictures and observe the battle scene, they can deliver weaponry, and if they are shot down, they are a great deal cheaper to replace and no one gets killed. So the United States is already very good in that area, Britain is also good, but there is always more that can be done.

Areas where America really does need to pay attention are cyber war and anti-satellite or satellite defenses because Russia and China, I think, have a greater capacity to wage cyber war than the United States, and the recent events with a number of hackers hacking into the Pentagon's most secret computers are alarming really. I mean if an individual working out of his bedroom in London can do it, and one of them has, then what can the Chinese and Russians do? And as far as shooting down American satellites is concerned the Chinese have been developing anti-satellite missiles for that specific purpose. And when you have an unmanned aerial drone in Afghanistan (or wherever it might be), it's controlled by somebody at a desk in Phoenix or somewhere like that; the commands go by satellite, and if you can shoot down the satellite you lose contact with the drone. That is somewhere where the United States is lacking and needs to address very urgently. In Britain we are having a big debate at the moment about whether we need the sort of expensive kit that will be necessary to project power overseas. Take, for example aircraft carriers: we are planning two new aircraft carriers, but they will be very, very expensive; they will be wonderful ships but will cost a great deal. Do we need them? Do we need our independent nuclear deterrent? Because that's going to

need replacing in about 10-15 years' time, and so on and so on. These [are the kinds of] questions that we have to answer. That is on the military side. On the economic side, I think no; it's just a matter of staying alert and watching what is going on and using the assessments and predictions of experts to guide government policy.

JMSIS: On that theme of cyber warfare, do you consider that to be a significant threat in the future?

KH: I consider it to be a major threat. I mentioned the vulnerability of western systems and there has been already one example of Russia using it in a dispute with Estonia. It was sort of a little demonstration of "don't get too uppity; this is what we can do to you if we want to any time we like," so it is a clear danger. They have a considerable cyber war capacity. So do the Chinese, and they are prepared to use it.

JMSIS: What do you consider to be the other major threats to world peace and security?

KH: I think the struggle for resources, particularly for resources of oil and gas. The United States imports over half of its oil, if I recall correctly. Recent discoveries in shale gas will help quite a bit; they'll help in power generation, but of course they won't help the transportation question. The United States has to find some way of reducing its consumption of oil simply because it will become increasingly in short supply and expensive as the century progresses. That's not a matter of carbon emissions or climate change; it's the simple law of supply and demand. China is increasing its purchases of oil greatly so it will be competing in the world market, so will India, [and] so will a lot of countries. Russia has the vast reserves which can easily supply Western Europe, [yet] there will be nervousness in a number of western European countries about relying too much on Russian supplies. The competition for resources is obviously one of the big problems.

JMSIS: Since your expertise is primarily South America: for several decades in the mid-to-late twentieth century there was so much revolution and so many coups and overthrows; is this an issue any longer?

KH: I think the age of emerging coups in South America is pretty well over. I wouldn't totally discount the possibility of one in a couple of countries which are

being particularly badly run. But when there was a hint some years ago when I was still in Brazil - we're talking 15 years ago - of a possible military takeover in Paraguay, very stern warnings were delivered to the Paraguayans by Brazil and Argentina that this would not be tolerated and they had better think again, and that was effective in ensuring the democratic government was not overthrown there. I think the same thing would happen if there were warnings of a possible coup elsewhere.

But I do remember in Libya we were expecting a military coup; we were looking closely at all the generals, brigadiers, and colonels, and it was carried out by the captains and lieutenants who were below the radar, as it were. [Libyan leader Muammar] Gaddafi was only a lieutenant when he staged his coups. He should have been a captain, but he was passed over for promotion because he was politically suspect. They should have gone the whole way and sort of removed him from the armed forces, and then maybe the coups wouldn't have happened. But the previous government didn't really deserve to survive anyway.

JMSIS: *Staying on that same topic, what was it like serving in a climate in South America where you just never knew when something like that might happen?*

KH: Well uncertainty and the possibility of personal risk was something I had from my very earliest days in the service when I was in Baghdad and we had two revolutions in 1962. One when the military dictator Abdul Karim Kassem was overthrown by the Baath Party and then nine months later when the Baath Party themselves were overturned by the army. Both of those involved quite major fighting in Baghdad itself. The first one in particular was fighting all around the embassy; having arrested Abdul Karim Kaseem they subsequently took him to the TV station and they didn't really try him, they merely showed him a list of people whose death warrant he'd signed. They said, "Did you sign the death warrant for these people?" and he said, "Yes". They said, "That's enough," and then they shot him and exhibited his body on TV to prove that he really was dead which was rather grisly, but he was supported by the communists, and most of the communists seemed to live next to the Embassy, so we had all sorts of street battles going on all around us. [At the embassy] we had two people wounded by small arms fire; in that case they were actually shooting at me and hit the two people on either side of me. The reason they were

shooting at me was that someone was trying to steal our Embassy launch which was on the river. The Embassy was on a river bank, and we had a launch that we used to just cross the river because it was quicker getting to our commercial office by boat than it was taking a car through very crowded streets over the bridge and back down the other side. Also, it used to be used for staff picnics and stuff like that, and they were trying to steal it, and I came with a loud haler (someone who speaks Arabic) to tell them to leave our boat alone. [When] I came up like this, somebody clearly thought I was going to project death rays or tear gas or something because they upped and fired against the loud haler. They didn't hit me but hit the two people on either side, so that was quite a narrow escape. The other occasion I was shot at was in Libya, but having threats to my personal safety and facing the very real possibility of getting shot or blown up by a bomb has been something I've lived with since my early days in the service, and most of the members of the service who've served in third world can say the same in at least one of their postings.

JMSIS: *Iran is a giant question mark; do you see it continuing this way indefinitely?*

KH: It is difficult to see where the organization would come from to overturn the present government. They have a stranglehold on the Iranian parliament the majority of its members are strong supports of the government and their elections are controlled by the Council of Guardians which is a gathering of senior clerics. You can't be a candidate for parliament unless you have their approval, so it's a very narrow range of opinion. There is plenty of discontent, but there is no organization which can focus that discontent and the regime has been quite sensible in one way by not trying to constrict Iranians' right to travel abroad, so those who don't can get out for a while and go to Europe or something and have a breather; then they come back and they put up with the restrictions on their life because, as I say, they are able to get out when they want to and have a different sort of life experience. So you know it is a big question mark. I don't see the government changing very much very soon. But how it will happen and when, I don't know. Nobody knows.



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